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NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM:
WELFARISM OUT OF CONTEXT
ROBERTA M. BERRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
This health care system of ours is badly broken, and
it is time to fix it. I
And we have three prime - three things we're trying
to achieve. The Republicans, and I think Mrs. Clin-
ton's group, likewise. First of all, we're trying to get
everybody covered in America. Secondly, we're trying
to hold down the costs. And thirdly, we want to
maintain the quality, make sure the quality, the im-
provements that the great American health care system
have seen, which is the best system in the world for
those who can afford it. We want that same best
system for everybody.2
In modern times, public policy makers have assumed a role
at the bedside. Judges hold hearings in hospital rooms to decide
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1. The Clinton Health Plan; Clinton Text: "This is Our Chance... Our
Journey", L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A8 (President William Clinton's
Speech on Health Care Reform) [hereinafter President Clinton's Speech].
2. Health Care Crisis Gets Ideological Responses (National Public Radio
broadcast, Aug. 17, 1993) (statement of Senator John Chafee).
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whether life-saving treatments will be provided, withheld, or
withdrawn. Legislators enact public health measures to eradicate
diseases that formerly afflicted millions. The President of the
United States proposes that Congress adopt a national health
care delivery system, hereinafter a "communal system," 3 to
provide the benefits of modern medicine to all Americans.
Policy makers unavoidably bring their own emotions and
individual ethical principles to these matters affecting the uni-
versal human experiences of suffering and death. In addition,
policy makers are obliged to abide by another set of ethical
3. Communal systems vary in their particulars, but typically they share
five characteristics: a plan for health care delivery that is designed and regulated
by government, guaranteed universal or nearly universal coverage regardless
of ability to pay or health status, coverage of a more or less comprehensive
range of governmentally defined health care benefits, legal limitations of some
sort on expenditures for health care, and compulsory funding for the health
care delivery plan. See generally UNDERSTANDING UNIVERSAL HEALTH PRO-
GRAMS: IssUEs AND OPTIONS (David A. Kindig & Robert B. Sullivan eds., 1992)
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING UNIVERSAL HEALTH PROGRAMS].
The major health care reform bills currently pending in Congress exhibit
some or all of these features. See H.R. 3600 & S. 1757, 103d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1993) (plan of President Clinton) (providing for federal funding and regula-
tion; coverage of all but illegal aliens; standard acute-care package with
prescription drugs, with some mental and home health; government sets annual
national limit on expenditures; mandatory employer/employee premium pay-
ments) [hereinafter Clinton Plan]; S. 1807, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (plan
of Senator Phil Gramm) (providing system designed by federal government
but with minimal regulation; uninsured induced to buy coverage through tax
credits; minimum benefits vary according to coverage; voluntary funding);
H.R. 1200 & S. 491, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (plan of Representative Jim
McDermott) (establishing single governmental payer system; all Americans
covered by 1995; extensive package, including acute care, set by American
Health Security Standards Board; government sets national spending limit tied
to prior budget year plus gross domestic product (GDP); financed by payroll
tax); H.R. 3222 & S. 1759, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (plan of Representative
Jim Cooper) (creating National Health Board; Private Health Care Standards
Commission defines health benefits, which Congress can amend; no global
budget; voluntary participation and funding); H.R. 3704 & S. 1770, 103d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (plan of Senator John Chafee) (creates National Benefits
Commission (NBC) and state regulated Health Insurance Purchasing Co-
operatives; universal coverage by the year 2000; two packages chosen by NBC:
one catastrophic, the other more comprehensive; financing limited to $25
billion per year; small businesses must offer coverage).
Communal systems currently in place in other countries exhibit most of
these characteristics. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Fielding & Pierre-Jean Lancry,
Lessons From France - "Vive la Difference," 270 JAMA 748 (1993) (com-
paring the French health care system and reform proposals in the United
States); Bradford L. Kirkman-Liff, Health Insurance Values and Implemen-
tation in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, 265 JAMA
2496 (1991) (describing key characteristics of the systems in place in the
Netherlands and Germany).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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principles: the principles of justice that establish what is ethically
right with respect to the governance of society.
This Article examines these principles of justice. What prin-
ciples should guide public policy decisions in the realm of
universal experiences? In particular, what principles of justice
should guide public policy makers contemplating reform of the
national health care delivery system?
Most participants in the public policy debate explicitly assert
or implicitly assume that the principles of welfarist consequen-
tialism, or "welfarism," ' 4 should guide policy makers. Welfarism
4. In his September 22, 1993 Speech on Health Care Reform, President
Clinton spoke in the language of welfarism, entreating political leaders and
the nation to support him in an effort to rationally construct a superior system
of health care delivery for the nation. President Clinton's Speech, supra note
1, at A8. He admonished them that the effort was not just desirable, but
ethically required:
This health care system of ours is badly broken, and it is time to
fix it.... We have to preserve and strengthen what is right with
the health care system, but we have got to fix what is wrong with
it.... Both sides, I think, understand the literal ethical imperative
of doing something about the system we have now.
Id.
Scanlon asserts that welfarism reflects the dominant mode of modem
reasoning about the demands of justice. T. M. Scanlon, Contractualism and
Utilitarianism, in UuTALkszs AND BEYOND 103, 103 (Amartya Sen &
Bernard Williams eds., 1982) [hereinafter Un=AriisM AND BEYOND].
[Utilitarian welfarism] occupies a central place in the moral phi-
losophy of our time. It is not the view which most people hold;
certainly there are very few who would claim to be active utilitar-
ians. But for a much wider range of people it is the view towards
which they find themselves pressed when they try to give a
theoretical account of their moral beliefs. Within moral philosophy
it represents a position one must struggle against if one wishes to
avoid it.
Id. For a discussion of "welfarist consequentialism," see Amartya Sen &
Bernard Williams, Introduction to UT=Arur, SM AND BEYOND, supra, at 3-
4.
The most common variant of welfarism is utilitarianism. Classical utili-
tarianism was developed by liberal British reformers Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick,
and Edgeworth. John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational
Behaviour, in U TrriANzsm AM BEYOND, supra, at 40. As Harsanyi de-
scribed these reformers:
Basically, both in politics and in ethics, they fought for reason
against mere tradition, dogmatism, and vested interests. In politics,
they conceived the revolutionary idea of judging existing social
institutions by an impartial rational test, that of social utility, and
did not hesitate to announce it in clear and unmistakable terms if
they felt that many of these institutions had definitely failed to
pass this test. Likewise, in ethics, they proposed to subject all
accepted moral rules to tests of rationality and social utility.
Id. See also Taylor's description of classical utilitarianism as a product of its
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holds that the choice of a public policy is "just" if the conse-
quences of that public policy maximize social welfare.5
This Article concludes, however, that welfarism cannot suc-
ceed in guiding policy makers to just choices in the context of
national health care delivery. In explaining why welfarism fails,
this Article notes ethical principles embedded in the historical
experience of doctors ministering to patients. These are principles
that welfarism cannot accommodate and that a successful theory
of justice must accommodate. Determining appropriate princi-
ples of justice for application in this context is a demanding
task, and an important one, as this nation and others continue
to struggle with health care delivery reform proposals. 6 This
Article proposes a beginning.
Part II of this Article assumes that welfarism is a valid theory
of justice as applied to issues of national health care delivery,
and accepts the social welfare goals identified by participants in
time, a time when rationalism supplanted theology as the dominant mode of
inquiry into matters of justice and individual ethics. Charles Taylor, The
Diversity of Goods, in UTILrrAR.ANISM AND BEYOND, supra, at 129.
5. Sen & Williams, supra note 4, at 4. This approach, focusing on the
social welfare maximizing consequences of policy measures, also characterizes
some methods of public policy analysis that seek to describe an efficient result
rather than necessarily to prescribe what justice requires. Frank Hahn, On
Some Difficulties of the Utilitarian Economist, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND,
supra note 4, at 187. As Hahn wrote:
The economic theory of public policy is relentlessly utilitarian:
policies are ranked by their utility consequences. ... The utilitar-
ian stance of Welfare Economics has proved very powerful in the
following sense: it has given precise arguments why one policy
under precisely stated conditions was to be preferred to all others
available.
Id.; see also Robert Sugden, Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities: A Review
of Inequality Reexamined by Amartya Sen, 31 J. EcoN. LIT. 1947, 1948-51
(1993) (discussing problems with revealed preference welfarism as a viable
theory of normative as opposed to positive economics). For a discussion of
utilitarian welfarism as coinciding with a natural rights theory of justice, see
generally David Friedman, Should Medicine Be a Commodity? An Economist's
Perspective, in RIrrs TO HEALTH CARE 259 (Thomas J. Bole & William B.
Bondeson eds., 1991) [hereinafter RIGHTS TO HEALTH CARE].
6. Numerous commentators have proposed a variety of approaches to
this task. See generally Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health
Care Insurance Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 37 (1993) (drawing upon ethical
principles of the medical profession); NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE
(1985) (proposing a life opportunity based account); CHmLES J. DOUGHERTY,
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: REALrrIEs, RiGHTS, AND REFORMS 23-132 (1988)
(drawing upon principles of a number of different theories of justice); PREs-
rENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL BIOMEDICAL
& BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 11-46, 183-97
(1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N] (drawing upon a number of different
theories).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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the public policy debate. Part II then analyzes whether welfarism
requires policy makers to adopt a communal system, and con-
cludes that it does not. Part III questions whether welfarism
succeeds as a theory of justice applied in this context, and
concludes that it does not. In addition, Part III concludes that
successful principles of justice must emerge from the context of
health care delivery.
II. WELFARISM AND COMMUNAL SYSTEMS: THE BEST WAY TO
Fix THis SYSTEM?
Now, people may disagree over the best way to fix
this system.7
A. Introduction
Most participants in the public policy debate regarding national
health care delivery not only agree that welfarism should guide
policy makers in their choice of just public policy, but they also
agree upon the social welfare goals of just public policy.8 They
agree that just public policy should assure broad access to health
care that is low in cost and high in quality. 9
Debaters disagree, however, about which public policy meas-
ures will achieve these social welfare goals.'0 The discussion
7. President Clinton's Speech, supra note 1, at A8.
8. "[W]e agree with President Clinton's concepts; we believe in coverage;
we believe in security, savings, responsibility - all the six things he talked
about. But I think to tell anybody it's going to be easy would be a mistake."
Sen. Robert Dole Interviewed About Health Care Reform (CNN News broad-
cast, Sept. 23, 1993). "'Fixing the system won't be easy,' [Vice President Al
Gore] warned. 'But the American people have demanded that we fundamentally
reform a system that costs too much, wastes too much, and serves too few.
We must make the system work better for real people with real problems."'
Charles Marwick, Physicians Tell Washington "You Want Our Help", 269
JAMA 1920 (1993); see also Alternative Plans: Gaining Support at the WH's
Expense, HEALTH LirE, Oct. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
HLTLNE File; David Lauter & Edwin Chen, Health Care for All - Three
Plans Compete, L.A. Tiams, Nov. 11, 1991, at Al (Senator John D. Rocke-
feller IV stating Americans are angry about the health care system and want
it changed); Mitchell Locin & Carol Jouzaitis, "Our Work has Just Begun,"
Cm. TRm., Jan. 26, 1994, at I (Senator Dole arguing for a modest proposal
that offers "greater access to health care for all"). See also supra notes 1-2.
9. See, e.g., David M. Eddy, What Care is "Essential"? What Care is
"Basic"?, 265 JAMA 782 (1991); Kevin Grumbach et al., Liberal Benefits,
Conservative Spending: The Physicians for a National Health Program Pro-
posal, 265 JAMA 2549 (1991); David U. Himmelstein et al., A National
Health Program for the United States: A Physicians' Proposal, 320 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 102 (1989); George D. Lundberg, National Health Care Reform: An
Aura of Inevitability is Upon Us, 265 JAMA 2566 (1991).
10. A number of vastly different proposals for national health care reform
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below analyzes the relative merits of a communal system and
of alternative reform proposals as means for achieving these
widely agreed upon goals.
B. Access to Health Care
Welfarist proponents of a communal system generally assert
that because a communal system guarantees universal access to
health care, and because access to health care contributes to
social welfare, policy makers should adopt a communal system. r
Access to health care is not, however, something that, in and
of itself, contributes to welfare in the sense that access to food,
housing, or entertainment may contribute to welfare.' 2 Rather,
access to health care is instrumental in furthering other goals
that may contribute to welfare. These goals may include: im-
proved health status for those obtaining access; 3 benefits to
others because improved health status enables individuals to
fulfill their family, work, and community obligations; 4 im-
proved security regarding the ability to obtain health care serv-
ices;' 5 benefits to others because improved security enables
individuals to make life changes, such as taking jobs in which
their talents are better applied, without fear of loss of health
benefits; 6 and a reduced incidence of "free riders" who impose
costs upon others by obtaining health care services and failing
to pay for the services.' 7
have garnered significant support; none has garnered majority support. Com-
pare Eddy, supra note 9 (designing a system to take care of basic and essential
needs); Grumbach et al., supra note 9 (proposing a plan for more benefits
for more people at a low cost to the consumer); with Himmelstein et al.,
supra note 9 (urging the adoption of a national health care program similar
to Canada's).
11. See, e.g., Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis,
265 JAMA 2491 (1991).
12. The hypochondriac is an exception. Hypochondriacs experience pleas-
ure not generally recognized by others in obtaining health care services.
13. See Friedman, supra note 11, at 2493 ("It is ... not unreasonable to
assume that medical indigence is associated with lack of care and poorer
health status.").
14. President Clinton, Address Before Congress upon Delivering the Health
Security Act of 1993 to Congress, U.S. NEwswmn (Oct. 27, 1993), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, USNWR file.
15. President Clinton's Speech, supra note 1, at A8.
16. This failure to make beneficial life changes arises because of the
phenomenon commonly referred to as "job lock." Job lock has been defined
as "unsatisfied people staying in jobs just to maintain health coverage." Kevin
Anderson, Workers Staying Put For Benefits, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 1991,
at 4B.
17. For a discussion of the free-rider problem, see Allen E. Buchanan,
Rights, Obligations, and the Special Importance of Health Care, in RPomGs
To HALT CARE, supra note 5, at 169, 177-81.https://openscholarship.wu tl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
WELFARISM OUT OF CONTEXT
Guaranteed universal access is of highly questionable instru-
mental value in achieving the first and second goals - improving
individuals' health status and consequent benefits to others -
for two reasons. First, guaranteed universal access reduces or
eliminates some but far from all barriers to actual access to
health care, and may introduce barriers to actual access as well.
Second, actual access is itself of limited instrumental value in
improving health status.
With respect to the first point - the efficacy of guaranteed
universal access in assuring actual access to health care -
guaranteed universal access does reduce or eliminate two prac-
tical barriers to actual access: inability to pay and poor health
status.'8 Reducing or eliminating these barriers likely would
improve somewhat the actual access of many uninsured Amer-
icans. 9 However, other practical barriers to actual access would
remain. Lack of medical facilities may reduce actual access to
health care for many individuals. For example, there may be
no doctors or hospitals within a two-hour drive or bus-ride of
their homes; or if there are nearby hospitals, they may not offer
appropriate specialized services, such as neonatal intensive care
units or burn centers.2 Even if appropriate health care services
18. Inability to pay prevents some Americans from purchasing compre-
hensive private health insurance coverage. This, in turn, forces these Americans
to pay for health care services directly if they can, obtain charity care if it is
available, or obtain coverage through a governmental program such as Med-
icaid if they qualify. See Friedman, supra note 11.
Poor health status prevents some Americans from purchasing comprehen-
sive health insurance coverage even though they could afford to do so. This
is because insurers refuse to provide coverage, or refuse to provide compre-
hensive coverage, to individuals with prior or current health problems. Insurers
refuse to provide coverage because these individuals could submit costly claims
against the insurer in the future in connection with these pre-existing condi-
tions. See Mark V. Pauly, A Primer on Competition in Medical Markets, in
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HoSPITALS ANDHALTH
INSURANCE 27, 51-56 (H.E. Frech III ed., 1988) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE IN
AMERICA].
19. Grumbach et al., supra note 9. Experience with the Medicaid program,
which provides coverage for some of the poorest Americans, suggests that
simply eliminating inability to pay as a barrier results in significantly greater
access to health care. Friedman, supra note 11, at 2493; see Social Security
Amendments of 1965, § 121, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 343 (1965)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
20. See Frances H. Miller & Graham A.H. Miller, The Painful Prescription:
A Procrustean Perspective, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1383, 1385 (1986) (ex-
plaining BNHS division into regional centers to provide specialized services);
Robert Pampalon, Health Discrepancies in Rural Areas in Qudbec, 33 Soc.
ScI. & MED. 355, 359 (1991) (study of rural health care in Quebec clearly
shows a progressive decline in health status as people live farther from urban
centers); R. Burciaga Valdez et al., Improving Access to Health Care in Latino
19941
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are available within a reasonable distance, individuals may not
avail themselves of the services for a variety of reasons. For
example, they may lack information or understanding about the
availability or desirability of the services,2' they may have com-
munication problems due to language barriers, 22 they may lack
ready access to transportation or child care, 23 or they may be
so overwhelmed with problems of day-to-day living that health
care takes low priority. 24 Some doctors and hospitals may apply
disproportionate resources to the treatment of select patients,
regardless of the theoretical entitlement of all patients. For
example, age, class, race, and gender biases may lead to differ-
ential treatment. 25 The diverse practical factors that determine
actual as opposed to theoretical access to health care are daunt-
ing, and the ability of policy makers to affect them is limited. 26
Guaranteed universal access may also introduce barriers to
actual access to health care. Budget constraints imposed under
communal systems may require the imposition of restrictions on
access. For example, lengthy waits for access to some health
care services are common under communal systems.27
Communities, 108 PuB. HEALTH REP. 534 (1993). In 1981, there were 2033
areas of the United States officially designated as Health Manpower Shortage
Areas. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 84. Within these areas, there
were 16 million Americans deemed "underserved." Id.; see also Henry Aaron
& William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice Before Us, 247
Sci. 418, 421 (1990) (considering the British experience in rationing health
care); Emily Campbell et al., Allocating Medical Resources and Medicaid:
Raising the Issues from a Psychological Jurisprudential Perspective, 60 UMKC
L. REv. 665, 700-01 (1992) (explaining that an individual's gender and race
are among the factors that affect one's access to health care).
21. Valdez et al., supra note 20, at 534; see also Pat Swift, Health Care
Crisis is Evident in Some Frightening Numbers, BuFF. NEws, Feb. 19, 1994,
at L7 (citing ignorance as a reason many women fail to get preventive care).
22. Barbara M. Aved et al., Barriers to Prenatal Care for Low-Income
Women, 158 W.J. MED. 493, 493 (1993); Eli Ginzberg & Miriam Ostrow,
Beyond Universal Health Insurance to Effective Care, 265 JAMA 2559, 2560
(1991); Valdez et al., supra note 20, at 534.
23. On the average, of people with no insurance, 25% must travel more
than 30 minutes, whereas only 18% of people with insurance travel more than
30 minutes for medical care. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 85; see
also Valdez et al., supra note 20, at 538 ("[A]bout 10 percent of Latinos
report lengthy, time-consuming travel to reach a health care facility.").
24. See Black Women with AIDS Lack Access to Treatment, Research, 8
AIDS ALERT 145 (Sept. 1993); see also Valdez et al., supra note 20, at 538
("[Some Latinos] forego seeking medical care because of household, job, or
family responsibilities.").
25. See Ginzberg & Ostrow, supra note 22, at 2560; see also Robert Baker,
The Inevitability of Health Care Rationing: A Case Study of Rationing in the
British National Health Service, in RATIONING AmERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE
OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 208, 217-21 (Martin A. Strosberg et al. eds., 1992)
[hereinafter RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE].
26. See Valdez et al., supra note 20, at 539-41.
27. See Ronald S. Bronow et al., The Physicians Who Care Plan: Pre-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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Guaranteed universal access pursuant to a communal system
is not the only and not necessarily the most effective means of
improving actual access to health care. Other policy measures
could reduce or elininate inability to pay and poor health status
as barriers to actual access. For example, the state or federal
governments could provide publicly-funded vouchers for the
purchase of health insurance, 2 and reformed insurance regula-
tions could prohibit insurance companies from refusing to pro-
vide coverage or placing limitations upon coverage based on
poor health status. 29 Policy measures to reduce or eliminate
other practical barriers to access do not bear any necessary
serving Quality and Equitability in American Medicine, 265 JAMA 2511, 2511
(1991) ("In the Canadian System, . . . [p]atients' needs take a backseat to
budget constraints."); Norman Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the
United States is so Hard: Cost Containment, Justice, and Provider Autonomy,
314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1381 (1986) (reporting budget constraints in
Great Britain have decreased access to some beneficial care); John K. Iglehart,
Canada's Health Care System Faces its Problems, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED.
562, 562 (1990) (reporting Canadians are demanding better access in the face
of a large budget deficit); see also infra part II.C. for a discussion of cost
containment under communal systems.
28. Such measures could supplement or supplant the current system of
Medicaid, which provides subsidized health care for some poor individuals,
and charity care primarily provided through hospitals and neighborhood health
centers. Other measures could include increased direct provision of subsidized
health care services, as well as the elimination of regulatory measures that
cumulatively have the effect of pricing health insurance beyond the ability of
low income individuals to pay for it. For a discussion of the effects of a
voucher system, see generally Nancy K. Rhoden, Free Markets, Consumer
Choice, and the Poor: Some Reasons for Caution in RIGHTS TO HEALTH CARE,
supra note 5, at 213, 213-38. For a discussion of a wide variety of state
initiatives to improve access, see IMPROVING AccEss TO HEALTH CARE: WHAT
CAN THE STATES Do? (John H. Goddeeris & Andrew J. Hogan eds., 1992)
[hereinafter IMPROVING AccEss TO HEALTH CARE].
29. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the Health
Insurance Association of America, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield have
proposed such regulations. Paul Cotton, Preexisting Conditions "Hold Amer-
icans Hostage" to Employers and Insurance, 265 JAMA 2451, 2452 (1991).
But see Pauly, supra note 18, at 51-56.
The purpose of insurance is to pool risky events so that each
person can pay a certain premium, equal to the expected loss he
faces, rather than face the probability distribution with the same
expected or average value but much larger variability. If people
are risk averse, they will gain by choosing the certain loss over
the risky loss. They will always be able to afford the insurance as
opposed to bearing the loss. Among a set of people with the same
expected loss at the beginning of a time period, insurance redis-
tributes wealth away from those who are lucky enough to stay
well to those unlucky enough to get sick. But it does not, and
should not be expected to, redistribute from those known to be
well at the beginning of the period to those known to be sick at
the beginning of the period.
Id. at 52 (emphasis original).
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relationship to adoption of a communal system. These policy
measures could target particular practical barriers, as by provid-
ing transportation assistance ° or information about the availa-
bility of health care services. 3
With respect to the second point - the limited contribution
of actual access to the goal of improved health status -
improvements in actual access do yield some improvements 2 in
health status.33 However, certain known factors affect health
status far more significantly. In addition, other poorly under-
stood factors also correlate far more strongly with health status.
Known factors that affect health status to a greater degree
than actual access to health care are public health measures and
individual behaviors. Public health measures include the purifi-
cation of water, disposal of sewage, and the promotion of
30. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 43 (proposing provision of
transportation for those in rural settings requiring specialized services that are
not locally available).
31. Valdez et al., supra note 20, at 540.
32. Andrew B. Bindman et al., A Public Hospital Closes: Impact on
Patients' Access to Care and Health Status, 264 JAMA 2899 (1990); Jack
Hadley et al., Comparison of Uninsured and Privately Insured Hospital
Patients: Condition on Admission, Resource Use, and Outcome, 265 JAMA
374 (1991); Mark B. Wenneker et al., The Association of Payer with Utilization
of Cardiac Procedures in Massachusetts, 264 JAMA 1255 (1990).
In Alabama, infant mortality rates dropped considerably, primarily due to
improved access to prenatal care for pregnant women and follow-up care for
newborns. PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N, supra note 6, at 54-55. Women who had no
health coverage or only Medicaid coverage had significantly more advanced
breast cancer on initial diagnosis than women with private health insurance
coverage. John Z. Ayanian et al., The Relation Between Health Insurance
Coverage and Clinical Outcomes Among Women with Breast Cancer, 329
NEw ENG. J. MED. 326, 329 (1993).
However, as one commentator has noted, "[D]espite heroic treatment,
technological advances, and widespread involvement of many groups in health
care, current life expectancy for adults has changed very little since the turn
of the century. Most of the change in life expectancy is attributable to decreases
in infant mortality." Robert M. Kaplan, The Connection Between Clinical
Health Promotion and Health Status: A Critical Overview, 39 AM. PSYCHOL.
755, 763 (1984). Furthermore, universal guaranteed coverage under the British
National Health Service does not appear to have affected the gap in health
status between socio-economic classes. JULIAN LEGRAND, THE STRATEGY OF
EQUALITY: REDISTRIBUTION AND THE SOCIAL SERVICES 126 (1982).
33. Improvements in health status may be defined differently. Improved
health status may be measured by gross indicia, such as mortality and morbidity
statistics, or may be measured according to finer criteria, such as success in
saving low birth weight infants. George J. Schieber & Jean-Pierre Poullier,
International Health Spending: Issues and Trends, 10:1 HEALTH AFF. 106, 116
(1991). Access to health care may improve health status as measured by some
indicia, but not by others.
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vaccinations. 4 Individual behaviors include using seat belts and
refraining from smoking.3 5
Other factors correlate strongly with health status for reasons
that are poorly understood. Health status correlates very strongly
with wealth, and may correlate with educational status and
employment status as well.3 Whether these factors are proxies
for differences in individual behaviors or for other factors
known to affect health status directly is unknown. 37
Thus, a number of factors - some understood, some not -
determine health status. Actual access is but one among many
of these factors and not necessarily the most significant.
Assuming that improved health status and the consequent
benefits to others are important social welfare goals, a welfarist
analysis might guide policy makers to reject policy measures
aimed at improving actual access in favor of alternative policy
measures more strongly correlated with improvements in health.
For example, rather than devoting social resources to improved
access to health care, policy makers could choose to devote
34. ANDREw HARPER, THE HEALTH OF POPULATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION
69-70 (1986); see also Edward S. Golub, Defeating Disease: Public Health
Remedies vs. Biomedical Quick Fbxs, Own, Sept. 1993, at 4 (discussing public
health responses to the AIDS epidemic); see generally DAN E. BEAUCHAMP,
THE HEALTH OF THE REPuBIC: EPIDEMICS, MEDICINE, AND MORALISM AS
CHALLENGES TO DEmOCRAcY (1988) (providing a historical and philosphical
background to American public health initiatives); LOUISE B. RUSSELL, Is
PREvENTIoN BETTER THAN CURE? 10-40 (1986) (examining preventive health
measures such as vaccinations).
35. See Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death
in the United States, 270 JAMA 2207 (1993) (noting the socioeconomic factors
that contribute to death in the United States).
36. See Jack M. Gurainik et al., Educational Status and Active Life
Expectancy Among Older Blacks and Whites, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 110,
115 (1993) (raising socioeconomic status may have a more significant effect
on health status than improving poor lifelong health practices); see also James
C. Hurowitz, Toward a Social Policy for Health, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED.
130, 131-32 (1993) (noting that studies show there is a correlation between
higher income and longevity and good health and there may be a correlation
between education and employment status and health); McGinnis & Foege,
supra note 35, at 2210-11 (concluding low income and educational status are
two factors that contribute to death in the United States). Although death
rates have declined in the United States during the past 30 years, for those
Americans whose educational levels and income have not risen, mortality rates
remain high. Gregory Pappas et al., The Increasing Disparity in Mortality
Between Socioeconomic Groups in the United States, 1960 and 1986, 329 NEw
ENO. J. MED. 103, 107 (1993).
37. Marcia Angell, Privilege and Health - What Is the Connection?, 329
NEw ENG. J. MED., 126, 126 (1993) (noting scientific confusion over the exact
correlation between privilege and health); see also McGinnis & Foege, supra
note 35, at 2211 (discussing the socioeconomic factors that contribute to death
in the United States).
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these resources to improving educational attainment or reducing
unemployment. 8
With respect to the third and fourth goals - improving
security and the consequent benefits to others - the effects of
universal guaranteed access under a communal system would be
mixed. Guaranteed universal access would improve the security
of those Americans who otherwise would be uninsured,3 9 and
of those who are insured but fear loss of coverage if they lose
38. Of course, the ability of policy makers to accomplish such goals is
limited. The ability to improve actual access to health care services is also
limited, however, and improved actual access likely affects health status far
less.
39. Most Americans are insured under private insurance group or individual
plans, self-insured plans of employers, or government plans including Medicaid
Title XIX (providing coverage of some poor persons) and Medicare Title
XVIII (providing coverage for most elderly persons). See Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396u (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). A patchwork
of regulations provide limited assurance of coverage upon termination of
employment or leave from employment. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161-1167 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992));
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat.
6 (1993). Other regulations assure coverage in the event of emergencies. See
COBRA, supra (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992)). Current estimates indicate that approximately 37 million Americans
are uninsured for some period of time in every year. Many others are
"underinsured" in the sense that they have coverage only for a limited range
of health care expenses and must pay for or obtain charity care for other
expenses. See VRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 49-182; see also John A.
MacDonald, Americans' Wish List for Health Care Focuses on Security, Cost,
HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 16, 1994, at Al; see also Friedman, supra note 11,
at 2492.
The insecurity endured by some uninsured Americans is, however, a matter
of choice. See John Holahan & Sheila Zedlewski, Expanding Mecidaid to
Cover Uninsured Americans, 10:1 HEALTH A'F. 45, 49 (1991) (5.9% of the
population that are under the age of 65 and incomes at least 300% above
poverty level do not purchase insurance). The choice not to purchase insurance
is not irrational from the perspective of some uninsured individuals. These
individuals may choose to self-insure after weighing and balancing private
insurance premium costs and their ability to set aside funds to assure a similar
level of coverage. Others may choose not to make any provision for health
care costs because they are healthy and the chances of needing costly care are
low, or because they are willing to rely upon the assistance of relatives or
charity care. Entitlements to emergency treatment and charity care under the
current American health care system, or assistance available from friends or
family may provide sufficient, if not perfect, security. Furthermore, for persons
with modest assets, safeguarding these assets through the purchase of insurance
is a far less worthwhile undertaking than for persons with substantial assets.
The failure to purchase insurance, however, does impose costs on others. See
infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of free riders.
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their jobs, change jobs,40 or their employer changes or eliminates
insurance coverage. 4' For individuals who are insured, guaran-
teed access would increase their willingness to make life changes
that may benefit others, such as taking new jobs that better use
their skills without fear of losing their coverage. 42
Secure access to health care is an elusive goal, however.
Expanding secure access to health care must come at some
expense. 43 The expense may be in the form of increased taxes, 44
decreased quality of care, 45 decreased choices regarding providers
of health care,46 decreased innovation, 47 decreased provision of
40. Three out of ten Americans report they or a member of their family
stayed in jobs, though they preferred to leave, because of fear of losing health
coverage. Anderson, supra note 16, at B4. In a poll by the Employee Benefit
Research Institute, 81% of the respondents believed changing jobs should not
bring with it a change in health insurance. Matthew P. Schwartz, Public
Supports Clinton's Main Reform Goals: Poll, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 4,
1993, at 42. A later poll by the same institute indicated 18% of workers
surveyed had turned down new jobs or stayed in jobs, solely because of their
desire to retain health care benefits. Stephen H. Dunphy, The Newsletter,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 22, 1994, at Dl.
Frustration with job lock has been a major force in the push for health
care reform. See Anderson, supra note 16, at B4 ("[W]hen nearly one-third
of the population ... feels frustrated by the health-care system in as personal
a way as job lock, the impetus for sweeping change is deep-seated."); see also
Schwartz, supra, at 42 (reporting that portability of health care benefits from
one job to another is a critical component of President Clinton's plan).
41. See, e.g., Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394 (lth Cir. 1993)
(holding that a reduction in coverage for individuals with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) does not violate Employee Retirement Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA)).
42. The life changes that security permits also include quitting employment
and other acts that may cause a net loss to other members of society. See
supra note 16.
43. Some assert that savings in unnecessary administrative costs and un-
necessary or cost-ineffective health care services can subsidize expanded actual
access under a communal system. However, as discussed infra part II.C,
administrative "savings" come at some expense as well, and determining what
are unnecessary and cost-ineffective services, and then assuring their elimina-
tion, are challenging tasks.
44. Under the Clinton Plan, see supra note 3, § 7111, a "sin tax" on
cigarettes subsidizes part of the expansion. To the extent this tax reduces
consumption of cigarettes, thus improving health status, a net savings would
be realized. To the extent smokers substitute other unhealthy habits, or
cigarette smuggling leads to increased crime, these savings may not be realized.
45. Obvious quality problems have arisen, for example, in Germany with
respect to the blood supply. Nicola Clark, Blood and Irony: Did Price Controls
Spread AIDS?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1993, at A14.
46. Iglehart, supra note 27, at 562 (reporting that Canada is struggling to
maintain consumers' free choice of doctors).
47. See Patricia M. Danzon, Hidden Overhead Costs: Is Canada's Systent
Really Less Expensive?, 11:1 HEALTH Arr. 21, 37 (1992). The Canadian system
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targeted services for the poor,48 reduced access to certain kinds
of health care, 49 or some combination of these results.
Communal systems typically absorb much of the expense of
secure access by restricting access to certain kinds of health care
services.5" Although these barriers to access are of little conse-
quence to most individuals, these barriers may result in the
denial of important or life-saving health care services for those
relatively few who are seriously ill.s Thus, for those who are
relatively healthy, a communal system may assure secure access
to health care services they are unlikely to require; for those
who are seriously ill, a communal system may reduce secure
access to health care services they likely will require.
Communal systems also may absorb some of the expense of
assuring secure access by reducing the provision of health care
services specifically and effectively targeted to the poorest Amer-
icans. The net effect may be a redistribution of secure access
from the poorest to the somewhat less poor and the middle
class .52
Assuming improved security and the consequent benefits to
others are important social welfare goals, alternative public
policy measures could improve the security of all at least to
spends less on research and development in part because it relies on the
research and development taking place in the United States. Id.; Baker, supra
note 25, at 213 (noting severe problems with lack of innovation under the
BNHS).
48. See LEGRAND, supra note 32, at 31.
49. See, e.g., THoMAs HALPER, THE MIsFoRTUNEs OF OTHERS 155 (1989).
The United Kingdom's program of denying renal dialysis may allow the country
to live within its means; however, it may also mean "the innocent and helpless
may be left with the highest price to pay." Id. at 155; see also Baker, supra
note 25, at 212 (regarding lengthy waiting lists for surgery and other acute
care under the BNHS).
50. Baker, supra note 25, at 212 (citing systemic bias under the BNHS
against acute care, nursing home care, emergency care, and tertiary care).
51. See, e.g., Herrick Peterson, Does U.S. Health Care Need a Dose of
Canadian Medicine?, Bus. & HEA.LTH, Nov. 1991, at 34, 39 (noting that
Canadian citizens faced such a long wait for cardiac surgery that the Govern-
ment contracted with hospitals in Seattle to perform 400 procedures in one
year). But see Raisa B. Deber, Canadian Medicare: Can it Work in the United
States? Will it Survive in Canada?, 19 Am. J.L. & MED. 75, 82 (1993) (arguing
that Canada's waiting list problem has been exaggerated by American com-
mentators). Lack of innovation under a communal system may aggravate the
negative health consequences to the seriously ill. See Baker, supra note 25, at
213.
52. The goal of the BNHS was to assure secure access to health care
according to need rather than wealth. The effect of the BNHS, as with other
social insurance measures, has been to redistribute resources to the middle
class to the detriment of the poorest. LEGRAND, supra note 32, at 28; see also
Baker, supra note 25, at 217-21; infra part III.D. (discussing expansion of
access to cover the relatively less poor under the Oregon Plan).https://openscholarship.wustl. du/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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some degree. Providing vouchers and prohibiting refusals of
coverage because of poor health status could improve security
without necessarily reducing the access of those who are sickest
or poorest. 53 However, any policy measures that have the effect
of expanding secure access must come at some expense.
With respect to the fifth goal - reducing the incidence of
free riders who fail to pay for health care services they obtain54
- the conclusions are again mixed. Communal systems match
a compulsory funding mechanism with an assured reimbursement
mechanism, thus eliminating uncompensated care.55 However,
assured reimbursement means that the costs of previously un-
compensated care are redistributed. This redistribution may re-
cast the free rider problem in the form of increased taxes5 6
decreased reimbursement rates5 7 or reductions in access or qual-
ity.58
53. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Assuming the vouchers
permitted the purchase of only limited health insurance benefits for the poorest,
security would be relatively better for the well-to-do and relatively worse for
the poorest. For a discussion of the effects of a voucher system, see Rhoden,
supra note 28, at 226-38; see also infra part III.D. for a discussion of rationing
of health care benefits to Medicaid recipients under the Oregon plan.
54. Those Americans who do not have health insurance, or sufficient
health insurance to cover all of their health care costs, often fail to pay some
or all of the costs of obtaining health care from health care providers. Health
care providers cope with this situation in part by cost-shifting: they increase
their charges to patients with more generous private or governmental insurance
coverage. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reforming the Health Care System: The Universal
Dilemma, 19 Am. J.L. & MED. 21, 30 (1993). In recent years, private insurers
increasingly have refused to bear the cost shift, denying full payment of
charges submitted. Also, government payers have both refused to bear the
cost shift and, further, ratcheted down their payments to the point that
reimbursement levels are below the costs of providing care in some cases.
Friedman, supra note 11, at 2492 (indicating that physicians hesitate to treat
Medicaid patients for this reason). This undercompensation by government
programs generates further cost-shifting, imposing a tax-by-cost-shift upon
others who obtain and pay for health care services. The consequences, espe-
cially for rural and urban hospitals caught in the reimbursement squeeze, have
been devastating. See Robert A. Carolina & M. Gregg Bloche, Paying for
Undercompensated Hospital Care: The Regressive Profile of a "Hidden Tax, "
2 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 144-46 (1992) (describing the regressiveness of the
cost-shift "tax"); see also Friedman, supra note II, at 2493-94 (describing the
difficulties for hospitals with many uninsured patients and few insured patients
to whom costs can be shifted).
55. This is considered an important feature of the German health care
system. For a detailed discussion of the German system, see Jeremy W. Hurst,
Reform of Health Care in Germany, 12:1 HEALT'H CARE FIN. REv. 73 (1991);
see also Kirkman-Liff, supra note 3, at 2496-97 (reporting the German system
has eliminated free rider problems).
56. Albert Warson, Canadian Health System Running a Fever, MOD.
HEALTHCARB, Feb. 14, 1994, at 78, 78-80 (describing Canadian budget con-
straints on health care).
57. Generally, Canadian physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis.
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Assuming that the elimination of free riders is an important
social welfare goal,5 9 alternative public policy measures could
achieve similar results, recasting the free rider problem in a
variety of ways. If the purchase of health insurance were sub-
sidized through the provision of vouchers6° and made manda-
tory,6' this would eliminate most of the free-rider problem.62
Alternatively, targeted policy measures could assure reimburse-
ment to particular hospitals and other health care providers
serving disproportionate numbers of nonpaying patients. 63
Deber, supra note 51, at 83. Because limited fee-for-service payments provide
incentives for physicians to practice on a volume-driven basis, the Canadian
provinces are pursuing methods for capping total physician payments. Id.
58. Canadian hospitals are reimbursed based on an annual "global budget."
Peterson, supra note 51, at 34. The hospital receives this lump sum through
periodic payments, with the hospital determining the distribution of such
funds. Id. Once the budget is established, if a hospital wants to add a service,
it must cut another area. Id. at 34-35; see Danzon, supra note 47, at 34; see
also Himmelstein et al., supra note 9, at 102 ("In HMOs we walk a tightrope
between thrift and penuriousness, too often under the pressure of surveillance
by bureaucrats more concerned with the bottom line than with other measures
of achievement."); infra notes 74-77 (discussing effects of price controls).
59. Numerous businesses suffer problems with customers who do not pay.
The distinction lies in the obligations imposed by law upon hospitals to provide
health care services regardless of patients' ability to pay. The Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 82 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)); Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, Pub.
L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
291 to -291o-I (1988)). But see Pauly, supra note 18, at 65. Pauly stated:
Much of uncompensated care is simply a natural consequence of
doing business on a credit basis. Once subsidies for the poor are
set at socially appropriate levels, any remaining problem of un-
compensated care would not really be a problem of public policy;
it would be a problem of the private business of hospitals.
Id.
60. See supra note 53.
61. The purchase of health insurance either could be made mandatory or
could be made mandatory only if an individual failed to pay for health care
rendered on one or more occasions. The provision of some other evidence of
financial responsibility could be permitted in lieu of evidence of the purchase
of health insurance. Such a scheme would accord with the rationale thatjustifies requiring motorists to purchase automobile insurance or provide other
forms of proof of financial responsibility for the benefit of innocent third
parties who suffer personal injury or property damage by the negligent acts
of these motorists.
62. Some individuals might not use their vouchers to purchase insurance
coverage or might incur expenses not covered by their insurance.
63. Pauly, supra note 18, at 65-66 (arguing that direct subsidies to the
poor would be preferable). "[T]he absence of information on what health
care the poor need most - and the sneaking suspicion that hospitals are
singularly inappropriate to provide it - makes it hard to favor direct transfers
to hospitals." Id. at 64.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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In sum, communal systems and noncommunal systems can
address the five access goals by a variety of policy measures.
Policy measures designed to achieve these goals always encounter
practical problems and always come at some expense, typically
absorbed in the form of trade-offs against other access, cost,
or quality goals.
C. Costs of Health Care
Federal and state policy makers, business leaders, and broad
segments of the American public find common cause in favoring
health care reform that promises to achieve the goal of cost
containment.( Proponents of communal systems assert that the
current American health care system suffers from two major
cost containment problems. The first problem cited is that
Americans spend too much money on health care services as
opposed to other goods and services. Commentators commonly
attribute this "macroallocation problem" to: private and gov-
ernmental insurance plans that encourage overuse of benefits, 65
the advent of expensive high technology equipment,6 the aging
of the population with consequent increased demand for treat-
ment of the illnesses of aging, 67 over-charging by health care
64. Poll results indicate that this is the most important goal for most
Americans. Richard Benedetto, Skepticism Grows Over Quality, Cost and
Choice, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 1993, at 2A (USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll
indicating 56% say costs will go up under Clinton's plan); Clinton Says Health
Plan Alterations Inevitable, SAN FRANcIsco EXAMINER, Mar. 3, 1994, at A14
(citing poll determining that public has "little appetite for new taxes, even to
pay for health care reform"); MacDonald, supra note 39, at Al (reporting
concern about increased cost is the "rock bottom" reason people oppose
Clinton's plan). For a discussion of the strong interest of business leaders in
cost control, see Richard A. Knox, Cost of Care Leaves Many in US Seeking
Better Way, BOSTON GLoBE, May 14, 1991, at N/Fl.
65. Problems with health insurance coverage cited include overuse of health
care services because of the incentives of the health care provider and the
consumer to draw upon the common fund to their mutual benefit in the short-
term, but with ever escalating costs in the long-term. See Pauly, supra note
18, at 29, 36-38; see generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 ScI. 1243 (1968) (applying economic theory of public goods misuse to
population control).
66. Jeff Goldsmith, Chronic illness and the Technologic Transformation
of American Health Care, in UNDERSTANDING UNIVERSAL HEALTH PROGRAMS,
supra note 3, at 42; Pauly, supra note 18, at 33-34; Dale A. Rublee, Medical
Technology in Canada, Germany, and the United States, 8:2 HEALTH Arr.
178 (1989).
67. Edward L. Schneider & Jack M. Guralnik, The Aging of America:
Impact on Health Care Costs, in UNDERSTANDING UNIVERSAL HEALTH PRO-
GRAMS, supra note 3, at 35.
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providers and insurers,68 and high administrative costs. 69 The
second problem cited is that Americans spend too much on
inefficient health care services that are not worth their costs.
Commentators commonly attribute this "microallocation
problem"70 to private and governmental insurance plans that
encourage overuse of benefits, 7' and to inefficiencies introduced
by high technology, treatment for the elderly, over-charging,
and high administrative costs.72 Proponents of communal sys-
tems assert that adoption of a communal system is necessary to
solve both the macroallocation and the microallocation prob-
lems. 73
68. Sources of over-charging cited include hospitals and insurance com-
panies. See Robert C. Evans, Tension, Compression, and Shear: Directions,
Stresses, and Outcomes of Health Care Cost Control, in UNDERSTANDING
UNIVERSAL HEALTH PROGRAMS, supra note 3, at 224, 225.
69. Id. But see Danzon, supra note 47 (arguing that administrative cost
savings under a communal system may be illusory because costs are saved at
the time and expense of the patient).
70. Health care services may be considered "not worth their costs" ac-
cording to a number of methods of analysis. Cost-benefit analysis considers
the value of one undertaking as opposed to another in terms of the benefits
to be achieved in comparison to the costs. Cost effectiveness refers to whether
one course of treatment intended to yield a given result is cheaper than another
course of treatment. See generally ALAN L. SoRKIN, HEALTH ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTION (3d ed. 1992). Other efforts to express the concept of whether
health care services are worth it are numerous. See, e.g., Eddy, supra note 9;
Robert M. Kaplan, A Quality-of-Life Approach to Health Resource Allocation,
in Rationing America's Medical Care, supra note 25, at 60, 60-75.
71. See supra note 65.
72. For a discussion of the perplexities of devising and applying cost-
effectiveness and related criteria for measuring whether health care is "worth
it," see Lisa Scott, Looking Beyond Cost, MoD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 28, 1994,
at 36-40; see also Rolla Edward Park et al., Physician Ratings of Appropriate
Indications for Three Procedures: Theoretical Indications vs. Indications Used
in Practice, 79 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 445, 449 (1989) (noting that "[p]atients
should know that a substantial percentage of procedures are performed for
indications about which expert physicians disagree"); John E. Wennberg et
al., Hospital Use and Mortality Among Medicare Beneficiaries in Boston and
New Haven, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1168 (1989); Steven H. Woolf, Practice
Guidelines: A New Reality in Medicine, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1811,
1812-17 (1990) (describing various entitites involved in developing practice
guidelines); supra note 5.
73. The current American health care system reflects no comprehensive
design to limit expenditures on health care, although temporary limited efforts
were undertaken as part of the wage and price controls of the Nixon admin-
istration. ODIN W. ANDERSON, HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: A
GROWTH ENTERPRISE SINCE 1875, at 205-06 (1985).
Piecemeal efforts by federal and state governments have included various
payment schemes designed to achieve overall savings, such as Medicare's
Diagnosis Related Groups, and efforts to limit hospital rates and restrict
capital construction projects by health care institutions, such as hospital ratehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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Communal systems address the macroallocation and microal-
location problems by a variety of devices. First, to limit overall
spending on health care, communal systems impose expenditure
limits, consisting either of limits on the reimbursement of serv-
ices, overall budget caps, or both.7 4 However, price controls,
price ceilings, and other similar devices generate responses in
regulated entities that threaten the effectiveness of these de-
vices." In addition, to the extent these devices are effective,
they typically generate distortions, 76 including reductions in ac-
cess, quality, or both."
review programs and certificate of need programs. Pauly, supra note 18, at
56-59. Efforts by private insurers have included the imposition of deductibles
and copayments, restrictions imposed upon providers by insurance company
utilization review administrators, and incentives to economize imposed by risk-
sharing health maintenance organization (HMO) arrangements. See Pauly,
supra note 18, at 40-44; see also Clark C. Havighurst, The Questionable Cost-
Containment Record of Commercial Health Insurers, in HEALTH CARE IN
AmEICA, supra note 18, at 221-56. See generally ANDERSON, supra; WARREN
GREENBERG, CoiLEmoN, REGULATION, AND RATIONING IN H-ALTH CARE
(1991). For a discussion of cost containment approaches under communal
systems, see Brian Abel-Smith, Cost Containment and New Priorities in the
European Community, 70 MILBANK Q. 393 (1992); Evans, supra note 68, at
224.
74. See supra notes 56-58. Although communal systems in other industri-
alized countries currently struggle with health care cost inflation comparable
to that in the United States, Miller & Miller, supra note 20, at 1385; Warson,
supra note 56, at 78, they have been successful in limiting the percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expended on health care services to levels
significantly lower than in the United States. In 1991, other communal systems
spent approximately 6 to 11% of GDP (France 9.1%, Canada 10%, Germany
8.5%) on health care in contrast to 13.4% in the United States. Fielding &
Lancry, supra note 3, at 748. These cost figures are not directly comparable,
however. For example, cited statistics for Canada's system often include
percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) spent on health care: in 1970,
both Canada and the United States spent 7% of GNP, yet by 1988 Canada's
spending had increased to only 8.5% of GNP compared to 11% in the United
States. BEAucHAM, supra note 34, at 239. Analysts often note Canada's slow
rate of increased health expenditures, but fail to note Canada's high rate of
GNP growth, the denominator in the percentage. Id. In essence, it could be
argued, Canada's increasing health care expenditures are merely being over-
shadowed by its rapidly rising GNP. Id. For a discussion of various "apples
to apples" and "oranges to oranges" comparisons of health care spending
among nations, see Schieber & Poullier, supra note 33, at 106.
75. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORm 68-69, 210-12, 250-
53 (1982). With respect to limits imposed upon health care providers, in
practice, physicians and hospitals have proved adept at frustrating these limits
by altering their practice patterns. In Germany, the numbers of visits and
lengths of hospitilization have increased in response to the constraints on
reimbursement. Hurst, supra note 55, at 76'
76. In a recent letter to President Clinton printed in the Wall Street
Journal,
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Second, communal systems address macroallocation and mi-
croallocation problems through targeted measures aimed at cited
causes of overuse or misuse of health care benefits. For example,
a communal system may ration access to high technology equip-
ment and promote preventive care to achieve greater cost ef-
fectiveness. 78 The elderly may be discouraged from using expensive
562 economists pointed out that the fee schedules, annual spending
caps and limits on insurance premiums and drug prices do, in
fact, constitute price controls, which historically and in other
countries have led to shortages, rationing and economic disaster.
They may "appear to reduce medical spending, but such gains are
illusory.... We will instead end up with lower-quality medical
care, reduced medical innovation and expensive new bureaucracies
to monitor compliance. These controls will hurt people and they
will damage the economy."
Joan Beck, Clinton Health Plan: Terminal Case of Wishful Thinking, CHI.
TRm., Jan. 23, 1994, at P3; see also DAvI D. FRIEDMAN, PiucE THEORY 390-
400 (1986). Consumers of drugs in the United States currently subsidize the
price controls on drugs in other countries. Pharmaceutical companies "cost-
shift" to the U.S. market. Pharmaceuticals: GAO Finds Drug Prices Higher
in U.S., HIEALT LnE, Feb. 3, .1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
HLTLNE file.
77. See Jerome C. Arnett, Jr., Canada's Single-Payer Health Scheme a
Singular Failure, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1993, at All ("[D]ogs at York Central
Hospital in metropolitan Toronto were able to get CAT scans immediately
while humans were put on a waiting list."); Bronow et al., supra note 27, at
2511 ("In the Canadian System... [p]atients' needs take a backseat to budget
constraints."); Daniels, supra note 27, at 1381 (1986) (reporting budget con-
straints in Great Britain have decreased access to some beneficial care);
Iglehart, supra note 27, at 562 (reporting Canadians are demanding better
access in the face of a large budget deficit); C. David Naylor, A Different
View of Queues in Ontario, 10:2 HEALTH AFF. 110, 110-11 (1991) (queues for
nonemergency treatments are a form of rationing).
78. For example, in France, for a hospital to get expensive equipment such
as a magnetic resonance imager (MRI), the hospital must obtain governmental
permission. Fielding & Lancry, supra note 3, at 754. This approval is based
upon several factors, including quantified proof of need and proof that the
hospital's current revenues are sufficient to pay for the equipment and the
servicing of the equipment. Id. The number of MRIs in France in 1991 was
1.23 MRIs per 1 million people compared to 3.8 (in hospitals alone) in the
United States in 1990. Id. In addition, "Canada has appreciably slowed the
diffusion of six major forms of technology: open-heart surgery, cardiac
catheterization, organ transplantation, radiation therapy, extracorporeal shock-
wave lithotropsy, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)." Iglehart, supra
note 27, at 565 (footnote omitted).
Much emphasis in the public policy debate has been placed upon the
concept of a basic benefits package pursuant to a communal system that
would emphasize preventive care. As numerous commentators have noted,
preventive care may be desirable, but it is not necessarily cost-effective and it
is likely to increase rather than decrease overall costs of health care. See
generally Kaplan, supra note 32, at 761-63 (noting that in spite of increased
emphasis on preventive care, there has been virtually no increase in lifehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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life-extending care. 79 Drug prices and insurance premiums may
be price controlled.'* Administrative costs may be reduced by
replacing most private insurance companies with a single gov-
ernmental payer.81
These communal system policy choices regarding how much
should be spent on health care services as opposed to other
goods and services, and regarding which health care services are
worth their costs, implement value judgments. 82 Because com-
munal systems are governmentally directed, they can implement
these value judgments fairly effectively. 3 In some cases, how-
ever, communal systems will make mistakes in their efforts to
implement these value judgments.8 4 In other cases, reasonable
people may disagree about the value judgments."5
Assuming that the goals of reducing the macroallocation and
microallocation problems are important social welfare goals, the
marketplace is the major alternative mechanism for achieving
them." However, the marketplace achieves these goals only after
redefining them. If, in a properly functioning market place,
consumers choose to spend their dollars on health care services,
expectancy for adults since the 1900s); Robert M. Kaplan, Behavioral Epide-
miology, Health Promotion, and Health Services, 23 MED. CARE 564, 565-77
(1985) (reviewing evidence for cost-effectiveness of preventive care); RUSSELL,
supra note 34, at 76 (concluding that "screening and treating hypertension
adds to medical expenditures"); PETR SKRABANEK & JAMES McColuIcK,
FoLiEs & FALLACIES IN MEDiCINE 83-102 (1990).
79. For a discussion of restrictions on renal dialysis for the elderly under
the BNHS, see Baker, supra note 25, at 218-21. See also Gumo CALABRESI &
Pmip BoBnrrr, T.AGIc CHoiCES 177-91 (1978) (comparing allocation of renal
dialysis units for the elderly in Italy, the United States, and England).
80. See supra note 76 (discussing price controls as a means of cost shifting
by current communal systems to the American health care system); see also
MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (Public Television broadcast, Feb. 8, 1994) (dis-
cussing the limitation of insurance costs under the Clinton Plan).
81. See Evans, supra note 68, at 224, 229-30.
82. For a discussion of the difficulties encountered in attempting to match
cost-effective measures with emotional values, see David C. Hadorn, Setting
Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-Effectiveness Meets the Rule of Rescue,
265 JAMA 2218 (1991); see also David M. Eddy, What's Going on in Oregon?,
266 JAMA 417 (1991).
83. These may be subject to evasions and distortions that are unanticipated
or beyond control. See supra notes 69-70.
84. For example, preventive care may not be cost-effective, hence pro-
motion of preventive care fails to achieve the goal that the communal system
values. See supra note 72.
85. For example, reasonable people may disagree about the cost effective-
ness of expensive life-extending care for the elderly and others. See supra
notes 73, 75.
86. Mixed approaches might implement some communal system measures,
such as defining benefit packages, and some marketplace measures. See, e.g.,
H.R. 3222 & S. 1759, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (plan of Rep. Jim Cooper).
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then the sum of their choices constitutes the proper macroallo-
cation of societal resources to health care services. If, in a
properly functioning marketplace, consumers choose to spend
their dollars on particular health care services that are worth
their costs to those consumers, then this choice constitutes the
proper microallocation of the consumers' resources to particular
health care services. Thus, from the perspective of free market
economics, macroeconomic and microeconomic problems arise
only if the marketplace is not functioning properly. The value
judgments to be implemented would be those of consumers
through their actions in the marketplace rather than those of
the designers of a communal system pursuant to the political
process.8 7
Proponents of the marketplace recognize that a variety of
imperfections distort the proper functioning of the marketplace.
The principal causes cited are: tax-favored treatment of health
insurance premiums;8 insurance coverage of health care ex-
penses; 89 and failures of consumer information. 90 Some market
imperfections are inevitable in an imperfect world. 91 However,
some could be reduced. For example, eliminating tax-favored
treatment of insurance premiums would improve the functioning
of the marketplace somewhat and, hence, would reduce mar-
ketplace macroallocation and microallocation problems.9 How-
ever, this improvement would come at the expense of those who
previously enjoyed the benefit of the tax subsidy.
In sum, communal systems and market systems are alternative
mechanisms for implementing value judgments regarding cost
containment goals. Both mechanisms entail trade-offs among
87. See generally Pauly, supra note 18, at 35-36.
88. See generally Paul J. Donahue, Federal Tax Treatment of Health Care
Expenditures: Is It Part of the Health Care Problem?, infra this volume, at
part II.A.
89. Id. parts III.C. and III.D.
90. See supra note 79; see also supra note 61.
91. See, e.g., Pauly, supra note 18, at 30-31, 44-51 (discussing the problem
of imperfect information).
92. See generally James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining
Government's Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor
Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REv. 849 (1981); Clark C. Havighurst, Compe-
tition in Health Services: Overview, Issues and Answers, 34 VAND. L. Rv.
1117, 1135-39 (1981); Havighurst, supra note 73, at 229-54 (explaining failures
of insurance company competition); Pauly, supra note 18, at 29-31, 44-51
(explaining problems with consumer information and problems with tax-
favored treatment of insurance that encourages overspending on health insur-
ance, and problems with overuse of health care services encouraged by health
insurance); Charles D. Weller, 'Free Choice' as a Restraint of Trade in
American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IowA L. Rnv. 1351, 1376
(1984) (explaining failures of health care provider competition).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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cost, access, and quality goals, and both face practical problems
in achieving implementation of their cost containment goals.
D. Quality of Health Care
Participants in health care reform debates are in general
agreement that the quality of health care available in the United
States to patients who have access to it is the best in the world
by nearly every measure. 9 Proponents of communal systems
generally do not dispute that the current health care system
delivers very high quality health care to most Americans. In-
stead, they argue that good or better quality care at equal or
lesser cost can be provided to all under a communal system. 94
To determine how well a health care system ensures quality
of care, one must specify indicia of quality and their relative
importance. Commentators propose a variety of indicia of health
care quality, 95 including that the care: improves gross measures
of mortality and morbidity; 6 relieves suffering; 97 is rendered in
accordance with standard medical practices; 98 achieves good
outcomes;" is delivered in comfortable and convenient circum-
stances by sensitive and considerate health care providers; 1'0 is
93. Marlene Cimons, Clinton Plan's Preventive Care Sparks Healthy De-
bate, L.A. Tims, Sept. 12, 1993, at Al; DOUGHERTY, supra note 6, at 3.
94. See, e.g., Grumbach et al., supra note 9; Himmelstein et al., supra
note 9, at 102.
95. See Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Issues in Measuring and Assuring Quality
of Care for Health Care Reform, 270 JAMA 1911 (1993) (highlighting readily
available and accurate ways to assess quality of care).
96. See James S. House et al., Age, Socioeconomic Status, and Health,
68 MILBANK Q. 383, 385, 398 (1990).
97. See Pauly, supra note 18, at 59-66; see also Schieber & Poullier, supra
note 33, at 116 (noting that some refined outcome measures, such as infant
mortality by birthweight, suggest that the United States is achieving superior
quality results in return for higher expenditures).
98. See, e.g., Paul R. Fortin, Quality Assurance in Canada: Does Insurance
Affect Assurance?, 19 J. RHEUMATOLOGY 11, 11 (1992) (noting Canadian
quality assurance efforts have traditionally emphasized satisfactory structures
and delivery of care, while American quality assurance efforts stress outcomes);
Bradford Kirkman-Liff & Gunter Neubauer, The Development of Quality
Assurance in the German Health Care System, QUALITY R. BULL., Aug. 1992,
at 266.
99. See Paul M. Ellwood, Shattuck Lecture-Outcomes Management: A
Technology of Patient Experience, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1549 (1988) (urging
physicians to use outcomes management to achieve better quality of life
outcomes for their patients); William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health
Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1197 (1988) (proposing a plan to improve health outcomes).
100. See AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QuALrry AND APPROACHES
TO rrs ASSESSMENT (1980), reprinted in BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIun"iy
AND QUALrTY IssuEs IN HEALTH CARE 14 (1991); see also John C. Mowen et
al., Waiting in the Emergency Room: How to Improve Patient Satisfaction,
13 J. HEALTH CARE MARKETING 26 (1993).
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something that consumers are willing to spend their money for; 10
and is rated "satisfactory" by the majority of consumers. 10 2
Proponents of communal systems often emphasize the first
and last of these indicia: mortality and morbidity statistics'013
and majority consumer satisfaction. 14 However, there are nu-
merous determinants of health status as measured by mortality
and morbidity statistics. Although health care certainly is one
of these determinants, it likely is not the primary determinant. 105
In addition, majority consumer satisfaction may reflect the fact
that most consumers are relatively healthy most of the time and
hence have no occasion to be dissatisfied with aspects of health
care that only the sickest have occasion to consider, such as
timely access to high technology care or access to expensive
treatments that offer relatively low likelihood of cure or ame-
lioration of disability or discomfort. 1'6
With respect to achieving quality care according to other
indicia, communal systems facilitate a targeted and uniform
approach. For example, if governmental decision-makers deter-
mine that preventive health care is of high quality because it
relieves suffering by treating illnesses sooner rather than later,
then a communal system's benefit package and physician incen-
tive package can encourage preventive treatments by primary
physicians rather than acute care by specialists. 1o The preference
of many individuals to obtain acute care as needed rather than
101. See Havighurst, supra note 92; Pauly, supra note 18, at 58; Weller,
supra note 92, at 1387.
102. Chris Adams, Health Plan not Wanted by All: Many Satisfied With
Own Policy, TMs-PICAYUNE, Jan. 23, 1994, at Al; Iglehart, supra note 27,
at 565 (noting that the public support level of Canada's health care plan is
very high).
103. Canada & Germany: Models for U.S. Health Care?, HEALTH LINE,
Mar. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, HLTLNE file. See also
SoRKiN, supra note 70, at 21-22.
104. An international survey evaluating consumer satisfaction across 10
countries' health care systems found German citizens' satisfaction ranked third
in the percent of consumers who felt only "minor changes" would be needed
in their systems. Hurst, supra note 55, at 82. In 1990, French citizens were
surveyed about their health system with the following responses: 10% wanted
a complete system overhaul (compared to 30% of Americans) and 40%
indicated fundamental changes needed to be made (compared to 60% of
Americans). Fielding & Lancry, supra note 3, at 748; see also Iglehart, supra
note 27, at 565 (survey indicating that 87% of Canadians are "very" or
"somewhat" satisfied with the Canadian system); Joel Havemann, Diagnosis:
Healthier in Europe, L.A. TImrs, Dec. 30, 1992, at Al (citing a 1990 Harvard
School of Public Health survey indicating only 10% of Americans believe
their "health care system works pretty well").
105. See supra notes 34-37.
106. See supra text accompanying note 51.
107. Eddy, supra note 82.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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preventive care on a routine or timely basis, as well as the
preference of physicians to specialize, will pose practical prob-
lems to implementation of this approach. Nonetheless, these
measures will have some effect.' °6 However, the governmental
decision-makers may be mistaken regarding the efficacy of pre-
ventive care in relieving suffering.' °9 Furthermore, reasonable
people may disagree about the relative importance of different
indicia of quality. For example, some may favor applying re-
sources to achieve long-term improvements in relief of suffering
that can be realized only through innovation and new
technologies" ° rather than short-term improvements in access or
cost that generate high consumer satisfaction."'
Communal systems allow fairly effective governmental imple-
mentation of quality assurance measures. Thus, the benefits,
mistakes, and consequences of the priorities established by the
communal system will be widely disseminated.
The current American health care system also generates ben-
efits and mistakes and yields value judgments regarding priori-
ties." 2 Policy measures to correct mistakes and adjust priorities
could include, for example, the adoption of practice guidelines
to encourage efficient practice styles that yield good outcomes." 3
Efforts to accomplish these goals will be imperfect given the
enormous difficulties of informing and altering the practice
patterns of doctors and other health care providers." 4 Such
policy measures also will yield mistakes and generate disagree-
ment regarding priorities.
108. See supra note 66.
109. See RUSSELL, supra note 34, at 63 (stating screening tests may increase
suffering because false-positive test results (those that incorrectly indicate a
patient has a condition) may cause patients unnecessary risk and discomfort);
see also Kaplan, supra note 70, at 575-77.
110. Baker, supra note 25, at 215-21.
111. Of course, it is impossible to measure the health status consequences
of opportunities for the development of new technology that are foregone.
There can be no "control society" in which resources are available as profit
incentives for the development of new technology as opposed to applied to
broader access or lower costs. The only comparison that can be drawn is
between the United States and other developed nations that have adopted
communal systems; generally, the United States yields more innovations. See
supra note 47.
112. See Wennberg et al., supra note 72 (1989) (studying variations in
clinical practice); John E. Wennberg et al., Are Hospital Services Rationed in
New Haven or Over-Utilized in Boston?, THE LANCET, May 23, 1987, at 1185,
1186-88 (same); see also Weller, supra note 92, at 1391 (discussing various
practice styles, all of which result in the same outcomes).
113. For example, Maine has enacted established "practice parameters" as
a safe harbor in medical malpractice actions. See FuRRow ET AL, supra note
100, at 141.
114. See supra note 66.
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In sum, the current American health care system yields high
quality care, but at relatively high cost and with limited access.
Communal systems broaden access and contain costs, and re-
order priorities regarding quality in some cases. Both systems
reflect trade-offs among quality, access, and cost goals. Both
encounter practical problems in efforts to reorder priorities.
E. Conclusion: The System Will Not Fix
Accepting welfarist principles, and accepting the social welfare
goals commonly cited in the public policy debate regarding
national health care delivery, the evidence does not support the
conclusion that adoption of a communal system would best
assure realization of these goals. Communal systems generally
achieve certain goals, such as secure access, better than other
goals, such as prompt access to expensive health care services.
Particular communal system policy measures, such as global
budgets, may achieve cost containment goals better than others,
such as fee schedules. Noncommunal systems generally assure
access to expensive life-extending care better than they assure
broad access to care. Particular noncommunal policy measures,
such as vouchers, may assure secure access better than others,
such as measures to improve market price competition among
insurers.
In short, modern health care delivery systems, whether com-
munal or noncommunal, struggle with the same unavoidable
trade-offs among competing goals and the same practical prob-
lems with devising particular policy measures that will be effec-
tive in achieving preferred goals. Communal systems do not
transcend or evade these trade-offs or practical problems. A
communal system cannot assure the broadest possible access to
the highest quality health care services at the lowest cost. Hence,
welfarism does not require adoption of a communal system as
an all-purpose fix, a means of assuring the best system for
everybody.
In fact, as the preceding discussion reveals, there is no best
system for everybody. The apparent consensus upon the three
social welfare goals that would define the best system is wholly
illusory. Upon closer examination, these three goals fracture
into numerous goals, each requiring a trade-off with one or
more other goals if any is to be realized. There is no consensus
regarding preferred goals in light of the trade-offs required.
Perhaps, then, policy makers should squarely face these trade-
offs and determine preferred social welfare goals. They then
could proceed to a more focused consideration of the relative
instrumental merits of various communal system and noncom-
munal system policy measures in achieving these goals. Perhapshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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welfarism would require adoption of a communal system if, for
example, policy makers concluded that secure access for all to
most health care services yielded more welfare benefits than
access to expensive life-extending care for few. Thus, by a
process of rational calculation of the consequences of adoption
of a communal system or of alternative policy measures, policy
makers could determine just public policy. This resort to wel-
farist principles cannot succeed, however, as discussed below.
III. WELFARISM AS AN ACCOUNT OF JUSTICE IN THREE
HEALTH CARE CONTEXTS
Both sides, I think, understand the literal ethical im-
perative of doing something about the system we have
now."15
A. Introduction
Resort to welfarist principles to determine the demands ofjustice in the context of national health care delivery tempts
policy makers for two reasons. First, welfarism invokes ration-
ality as a means to determine the requirements of justice.
Rationality in modern medicine and politics has been a power-
fully effective weapon in the battle against suffering and death.
The achievements of modern medicine for individual patients
and of public health measures for communities attest to its
force. A national health care delivery system promises the de-
livery of the benefits of modern medicine to the national com-
munity, a marriage of individual medicine and community health.
Welfarist analysis appears well-suited to establishing the just
terms of this marriage.
Second, welfarism holds out the promise of clear and definite
answers to the question: what is ethically required of society in
response to the suffering and deaths of its members? Clear and
definite answers are especially appealing in this context.
A number of objections have been posed to the welfarist
conception of justice, however. These objections are founded in
conflicts with competing principles of individual ethics and
justice, and in practical problems with applying welfarist anal-
ysis. These objections arise in applying welfarist principles to
determine the content of individual welfare, to compare the
welfare experiences of different individuals, and to calculate the
maximization of social welfare." 6
115. President Clinton's Speech, supra note 1, at A8.
116. Problems of implementing effective policy measures to maximize social
welfare, as discussed in part II, supra, also will give rise to objections.
However, problems of implementation in a complex world will plague efforts
to realize the commands of any theory of justice.
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Welfarist analysis first requires that policy makers define the
content of individual welfare." '7 For example, different welfarist
theorists characterize individual welfare variously as the enjoy-
ment of pleasures, or the satisfaction of actual, rational, or
revealed preferences.11 8 Some theorists exclude unacceptable kinds
of pleasures or preferences, such as sadistic pleasures or prefer-
ences with respect to the conduct of other peoples' lives."19
Welfarism next requires a comparison and ranking of the
welfare experiences of different individuals that result from
proposed policy measures.' 20 To compare and rank individual
welfare experiences, policy makers must be able to know the
different welfare experiences of individuals and must be able to
rank them on a common metric.'
21
117. For a critique of welfarist analysis on this point, see H. TRISTRAM
ENGELHARDT, JR., BIOETHics AND SECULAR HUMANISM: THE SEARCH FOR A
COMMON MoALTY 107-09 (1991).
118. Harsanyi explained his conception of individual welfare as the satis-
faction of true preferences as opposed to manifest or actual preferences:
[An individual's] manifest preferences are his actual preferences
as manifested by his observed behaviour, including preferences
possibly based on erroneous factual beliefs, or on careless logical
analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment greatly hinder
rational choice. In contrast, a person's true preferences are the
preferences he would have if he had all the relevant factual
information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and
were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice. Given
this distinction, a person's rational wants are those consistent with
his true preferences and, therefore, consistent with all the relevant
factual information and with the best possible logical analysis of
this information, whereas irrational wants are those that fail this
test .... [S]ocial utility must be defined in terms of people's true
preferences rather than in terms of their manifest preferences.
Harsanyi, supra note 4, at 55. For a discussion of alternative definitions of
social welfare, see Peter J. Hammond, Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Infor-
mation, in UTrLImARI ,MM AND BEYOND, supra note 4, at 86-87; Harsanyi,
supra note 4, at 54-56. For a discussion of persistent practical problems with
all of these characterizations, see Sugden, supra note 5.
119. Harsanyi proposes to exclude from consideration "all clearly antisocial
preferences, such as sadism, envy, resentment, and malice." Harsanyi, supra
note 4, at 56; see also Hammond, supra note 118, at 87.
120. For a critique of welfarist analysis on this point, see Partha Dasgupta,
Utilitarianism, Information and Rights, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra
note 4, at 199, 205-06; John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in
UTILiTIANis AND BEYOND, supra note 4, at 159, 159-61; see also Sugden,
supra note 5, at 1950-51 (discussing the attempt in revealed preference wel-
farism to avoid problems with interpersonal comparisons of welfare).
121. Welfarist theorists argue that all human beings are enough alike, and
sensible enough about how they are alike, to accommodate the modest demands
of interpersonal comparison. Harsanyi argues "imaginative empathy" is re-
quired to make interpersonal utility comparisons:
[A]ny interpersonal utility comparison is based in what I will callhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
WELFARISM OUT OF CONTEXT
Finally, welfarist analysis requires application of a formula
to calculate the social welfare consequences of proposed policy
measures.'2 The formula must aggregate in some fashion indi-
vidual welfare experiences that result from policy measures to
determine which policy measure maximizes social welfare. For
example, classical utilitarianism calculates the maximization of
social welfare by aggregating the units of pleasure and units of
pain of all members of society that result from a particular
policy measure. The policy measure that yields the greatest excess
of pleasure over pain maximizes social welfare.'21 Other ap-
proaches calculate the maximization of social welfare by deter-
mining the policy measure that maximizes the welfare of the
worst-off person, or by determining the policy measure that
improves the welfare of any person without diminishing the
welfare of any other person. 24
The discussion below analyzes objections to the application
of welfarism in three health care contexts. With respect to
bioethical issues, policy makers generally reject welfarist ap-
proaches to determining the requirements of justice. In contrast,
welfarism generally prevails in the context of public health issues.
With respect to health care delivery issues, the contest between
welfarist and nonwelfarist principles is unresolved. For reasons
the similarity postulate, to be defined as the assumption that, once
proper allowances have been made for the empirically given dif-
ferences in taste, education, etc., between me and another person,
then it is reasonable for me to assume that our basic psychological
reactions to any given alternative will be otherwise much the
same....
In general, if we have enough information about a given person,
and make a real effort to attain an imaginative empathy with him,
we can probably make reasonably good estimates of the utilities
and disutilities he would obtain from various alternatives....
In any case, utilitarian theory does not involve the assumption
that people are very good at making interpersonal utility compar-
isons. It involves only the assumption that, in many cases, people
simply have to make such comparisons in order to make certain
moral decisions - however badly they may make them. If I am
trying to decide which member of my family is in greatest need
of food, I may sometimes badly misjudge the situation. But I
simply have to make some decision. I cannot let all members of
my family go hungry because I have philosophical scruples about
interpersonal comparisons and cannot make up my mind.
Harsanyi, supra note 4, at 50.
122. For a critique of welfarist analysis on this point, see ROBERT M.
VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDIcAL ETHcs 259-61 (1981).
123. Sen & Williams, supra note 4, at 4.
124. Id. at 4 n.4 (discussing the Rawlsian Difference Principle as a method
of calculating the maximization of social welfare). For a discussion of Pareto
and Marshall efficiency, see Friedman, supra note 5, at 262.
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discussed below, the application of welfarism should vary ac-
cording to context, and welfarist principles should play only a
limited role in determining the requirements of justice with
respect to a national health care delivery system.
B. Welfarism and Bioethics
Bioethical issues require policy makers to find just resolutions
to tragedies involving the role of modern medicine in individual
experiences of suffering and death. 12 Welfarism fails as a guide
to the requirements of justice in this context.
In the context of bioethics, there is no consensus with respect
to the goals of medical intervention, or with respect to acceptable
means to achieve these goals. One individual resists death with
all that modern medicine has to offer, the other surrenders to
death without resort to life-extending procedures. 126 Preferences
regarding goals and means in the context of bioethics are diverse.
In addition, individuals value highly their preferences regard-
ing the goals and means of medical intervention. Bioethical
tragedies pose stark choices between important goals, such as
avoiding further suffering and avoiding death. The means em-
ployed by modern medicine are often highly intrusive upon
personal privacy and upon the human body. These important
goals and intrusive means arouse intense emotions and often
implicate ethical principles. In choosing death rather than con-
tinued suffering, one individual feels terror, the other serenity. 2 7
125. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
Petitioner, Elizabeth Bouvia, ... seeks the removal from her
body of a nasogastric tube inserted and maintained against her
will and without her consent by physicians who so placed it for
the purpose of keeping her alive through involuntary forced feed-
ing .... Petitioner is a 28-year old woman .... Except for a few
fingers of one hand and some slight head and facial movements,
she is immobile. She is physically helpless and wholly unable to
care for herself .... She is in continual pain .... She has on
several occasions expressed the desire to die.
Id. at 298-300.
126. See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. Morris County Ct.
1978). Quackenbush involved the visit of a judge to determine the competency
of Mr. Quackenbush, a 72-year-old man, in light of Mr. Quackenbush's
refusal to allow amputation of a gangrenous leg to avoid death: "He spoke
somewhat philosophically about his circumstances and desires. He hopes for
a miracle but realizes there is no great likelihood of its occurrence. He indicates
a desire - plebian, as he described it - to return to his trailer and live out
his life." Id. at 788.
127. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989)
(upholding Mrs. Wons' constitutional rights of privacy and free exercise of
religion to refuse a blood transfusion although the consequence would be
death).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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One believes that the relief of suffering is an ethical imperative,
the other believes that suffering should be endured. 12
Thus, in this context, preferences regarding goals and means
are diverse and highly valued. Consequently, objections to wel-
farism apply with force as the public policy debate surrounding
the use of anencephalic infants as organ donors illustrates. 129
Anencephalic infants are born without all or most of the
cerebral hemispheres, but with functioning brain stems. 130 An-
encephalic infants invariably die soon after birth, usually within
a day or two.' Although the absence of the cerebral hemi-
spheres means that these infants cannot develop self-awareness
and cognitive abilities, during their brief lives they display brain
functioning not very different from that of newborns with
normal brains. 32
The other organs of anencephalic infants are often normal or
near normal and, hence, potentially suitable for transplantation
into other infants. 13 3 However, these other organs deteriorate
during the normal dying process of anencephalic infants, thus
rendering them no longer suitable for transplantation. 3 4
At one time in the United States, anencephalic infants were
sacrificed and their organs harvested for transplantation into
128. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). The Conroy court
recognized differences in this regard: "Nevertheless, even in the context of
severe pain, life-sustaining treatment should not be withdrawn from an incom-
petent patient who had previously expressed a wish to be kept alive in spite
of any pain he might experience." Id. at 1232.
129. See generally Jeffrey R. Botkin, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors,
82 F'EDIATRICS 250 (1988); Thomas Leggans, Anencephalic Infants as Organ
Donors, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 449 (1988) (advocating the use of organ transplants
from anencephalic infants); Alan Shewmon et al., The Use of Anencephalic
Infants as Organ Sources: A Critique, 261 JAMA 1773 (1989); Robert D.
Truog & John C. Fletcher, Anencephalic Newborns: Can Organs be Trans-
planted before Brain Death?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 388 (1989); James W.
Walters & Stephen Ashwal, Organ Prolongation in Anencephalic Infants:
Ethical and Medical Issues, 18 HAsTINGs CENTER REP. 19 (Oct./Nov. 1988).
130. The cerebral hemispheres permit cognitive functioning; the brain stem
is responsible for maintaining the functioning of the heart, lungs, and reflexes.
Botkin, supra note 129, at 252-53; BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., BiOETHICS:
HEALTH CARE LAW AND Ermcs 200 (1991).
131. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 130, at 200; Walters & Ashwal, supra
note 129, at 19.
132. Some anencephalic newborns may respond preferentially to their moth-
ers, and display consolability and the ability for conditioning and associative
learning. Shewmon et al., supra note 129, at 1776.
133. Regarding limitations on the suitability of anencephalic infants as organ
donors for a variety of practical reasons, see Shewmon et al., supra note 129,
at 1774-75.
134. Botkin, supra note 129, at 251; FURROW ET AL., supra note 130, at
201.
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other infants. 35 The circumstances surrounding the first trans-
plantation of an anencephalic infant's heart are described as
follows:
Three days after [Christiaan Barnard's first human-
to-human heart transplant], [Dr. Adrian] Kantrowitz
performed the first human-to-human heart transplant
in the United States .... [The donor was an anen-
cephalic newborn .... [T]he infant was cooled by
immersion in ice water, and the heart removed im-
mediately after it ceased beating spontaneously. The
recipient died six and one-half hours later, but Kan-
trowitz described the operation as "technically suc-
cessful." 36
Currently, sacrificing anencephalic infants in the United States
likely would constitute murder. 1
37
135. Some hospitals instead permitted medical intervention to artificially
sustain anencephaic infants during the dying process so that their organs
remained suitable for transplantation after death. See FURROW ET AL., supra
note 130, at 202; see also George J. Annas, From Canada with Love:
Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors?, 17 HASTINGS CENTER RP. 36, 36
(Dec. 1987). Annas recounted a successful transplantation apparently involving
medical intervention to preserve the organs of an anencephalic infant during
the dying process:
When ultrasound revealed that her fetus suffered from anencephaly
[the mother] was presented with three options: induction of labor,
cesarean section, or carrying the fetus to term. She and her
husband decided to continue with their plans for natural childbirth,
and to offer the child's organs for donation .... Baby Gabriel,
named after the archangel who guards the gates of heaven, breathed
without assistance throughout her first night of life. The following
day she was transferred to Children's Hospital in Western Ontario,
where she was placed on a mechanical ventilator while preparations
were made for organ donation .... Leonard Bailey of Loma
Linda, California, had a pregnant patient whose fetus had been
diagnosed as suffering from hypoplastic left heart .... A decision
was made to deliver that child prematurely by cesarean section to
take advantage of the available organ. Baby Gabriel was pro-
nounced dead in Canada and flown to Loma Linda, where death
was confirmed. The heart transplant was performed and the
recipient, named Paul, . . . has so far survived.
Id. at 36. Medical intervention raises issues similar to that of sacrifice but
involving a less dramatic imposition upon the anencephalic infant. Instead of
being killed, the infant's life is extended, possibly entailing the infliction of
pain, some or all of which may be eased by the use of anesthetics. The debate
regarding these practices has abated in part because opportunities for successful
transplantation of anencephalic organs currently appear to be few in number.
See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 130, at 201-02.
136. Anencephalic Donors: Controversy in the 1960s, 17 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 38 (Dec. 1987).
137. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 130, at 201-02. Most statutory defi-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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A welfarist account of justice might guide policy makers to
enact policy measures expressly permitting3 8 the harvesting and
transplantation of organs from anencephalic infants. l 9 Reci-
pients of the organs could lead full and healthy lives instead of
dying in infancy. Donor infants would die anyway in a matter
of hours or days after the moment of sacrifice. Hence, the
pleasure of recipients and their loved ones would outweigh any
pain'O of donors and their loved ones. 41
The application of welfarist principles to determine the re-
quirements of justice in the above situation proves problematic,
however. First, with respect to determining the content of in-
dividual welfare, welfarism does not provide an obvious answer
to the question of whether pleasure deriving from the sacrifice
of another person is an acceptable pleasure that should be
included in determining the content of individual welfare. 142 If
this were an acceptable kind of pleasure, then the sacrifice of
orphans, the elderly, or the ill would be permitted, assuming
that in these cases the pleasure of organ recipients and their
loved ones would be greater than the pain of donors and their
loved ones.
Perhaps this strongly counterintuitive result would be avoided,
however, if all pleasure and pain resulting from such a policy
nitions of death are based upon the Uniform Determination of Death Act or
otherwise adopt a standard that requires complete cessation of all brain
function, including the functioning of the brain stem, or the complete cessation
of all circulatory and respiratory function. Botkin, supra note 129, at 252.
Because anencephalic infants have functioning brain stems, they are not dead.
Hence, killing these infants likely would constitute murder.
138. Presumably, a welfarist policy would permit the sacrifice only if the
parents consented and the hospital and medical personnel agreed to participate
in the sacrifice. Requiring the sacrifice against the wishes of any of these
individuals presumably would inflict so much harm that social welfare would
not be maximized.
139. This would require amendment either of statutory definitions of death,
see supra note 137, or of statutory prohibitions of the harvesting of organs
for donation before the donor is dead, according to the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act as adopted in all 50 states. Id. See also Kathleen L. Paliokas,
Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: An Assessment of "Death" and
the Legislative Policy, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 201-34 (1989) (reviewing
the legal status of anencephalic newborns).
140. Part III of this Article refers to pleasure and pain as characterizations
of individual welfare, except when the characterization itself poses a problem
to welfarist analysis. See infra part III.D.
141. A welfarist account might conclude to the contrary that a legal rule
permitting sacrifice would yield disutility over time because it would invite
disrespect for persons and ever-increasing encroachments on the security of
individual life, or because of its impact on medical personnel who participate
in sacrificing one person for the sake of another, or its effects upon society's
trust in the medical profession. See Botkin, supra note 129, at 253.
142. See Harsanyi, supra note 4, at 56.
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measure were properly accounted for. The widespread pain
caused by awareness that one could, at any time, fall into a
class subject to sacrifice for the benefit of others might outweigh
the pleasure to relatively few organ recipients and their loved
ones. Hence, the sacrifice of those capable of self-awareness
would not be permitted. The sacrifice of anencephalic infants,
on the other hand, would be permitted because they lack self-
awareness.
This, however, would permit inclusion of pleasure derived
from the sacrifice of those who have lost higher brain function-
ing as a result of illness or injury. Again, perhaps this strongly
counterintuitive result would be avoided because of the pervasive
fear such a policy would generate given that everyone is suscep-
tible to illness and injury. Hence, sacrifice would be permitted
only of those who had never experienced higher brain function-
ing, including anencephalic infants. 43
Welfarist analysis offers no principled basis for excluding
pleasure derived from the sacrifice of other persons in deter-
mining the content of individual welfare. '" If such pleasure were
included, and if permitting the sacrifice of anencephalic infants
would yield more pleasure than pain, welfarism would guide
policy makers to adopt a policy permitting such sacrifice.
However, in the context of bioethics, policy makers over-
whelmingly reject this consequentialist reasoning. 45 Instead, pol-
143. Alternatively, anencephalic infants could be declared nonpersons, ac-
cording to criteria that declare those who never had higher brain functioning
as nonpersons notwithstanding the fact that they are born of human stock.
Then, perhaps the pleasure deriving from their sacrifice should be included
because it entails the sacrifice only of a nonperson who is born of human
stock. Although this might avoid federal constitutional (Fourteenth Amend-
ment), state constitutional (due process or other provisions), and statutory
(e.g., murder) restrictions on sacrificing these infants, it would not provide,
in itself, a reasoned basis for distinguishing these infants from other persons.
Leggans, supra note 129, at 450. As the debate surrounding abortion reveals,
defining who is a "person" for purposes of entitlement to constitutional and
other legal rights is not merely a matter of logically applying a set of
scientifically determined criteria. A "person" is that creation of human stock
that other creations of human stock, with the power of decision, decide should
not be killed or caused to suffer without justification.
144. Some welfarist theorists engraft individual rights as constraints on
consequentialist reasoning. See R.M. Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism,
in UnLITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 4, at 23, 25-38; see also Harsanyi,
supra note 4, at 61-62.
145. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). The court, regarding
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent
patient, stated: "[W]e expressly decline to authorize decision-making based on
assessments of the personal worth or social utility of another's life, or the
value of that life to others." Id. at 1232-33. Other informative decisionshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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icy makers recognize some individual rights that are not subject
to compromise regardless of the welfare consequences to oth-
ers. 14 These rights include constitutional and statutory protec-
tions of privacy and free exercise of religion, and common-law
protection of rights to make decisions regarding medical treat-
ment and other decisions. 147
include the majority decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court upon review upholding the power of the State of
Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent person's
desire that she not be sustained in a persistent vegetative state by the admin-
istration of life-sustaining hydration and nutrition. See Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-83 (1990); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 425-26 (Mo. 1988). Dissenters on the Missouri Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court both mentioned the social welfare
consequences of sustaining a woman in a persistent vegetative state. See
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 354 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d at 427 (Mo. 1988) (Blackmar, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens'
dissent stated: "Today the State of Missouri has announced its intent to spend
several hundred thousand dollars in preserving the life of Nancy Beth Cruzan
in order to vindicate its general policy favoring the preservation of human
life." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmar, in
his dissent to the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion, expressly noted the
welfarist concern:
The absolutist position is also infirm because the state does not
stand prepared to finance the preservation of life, without regard
to the cost, in very many cases. In this particular case the state
has Nancy in its possession, and is litigating its right to keep her.
Yet, several years ago, a respected judge needed extraordinary
treatment which the hospital in which he was a patient was not
willing to furnish without a huge advance deposit and the state
apparently had no desire to help out. Many people die because of
the unavailability of heroic medical treatment. It simply cannot
be said that the state's interest in preserving and prolonging life
is absolute.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 429 (Blackmar, J., dissenting); see also
FuRRow ET AL., supra note 130, at 232-33 (discussing impact of Cruzan cases).
146. An example of legislative decision-making in the bioethical context that
protects individual rights regardless of the welfare consequences to others is
the approach to organ donation in the United States. Because of religious and
other objections to removal of organs from dead bodies, all 50 state legislatures
have adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) requiring an affir-
mative agreement to donation in advance of death by the organ donor, or an
affirmative agreement by relatives upon the death of the organ donor, rather
than permitting the harvesting of organs from dead bodies in the absence of
knowledge of the donor's objection. See Arthur J. Matas et al., A Proposal
for Cadaver Organ Procurement: Routine Removal of Cadaver Organs, 10 J.
HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 231 (1985).
147. Some state constitutions contain provisions protecting privacy. See,
e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. In cases involving objection to the administration
of blood transfusions, courts generally have been amenable to constitutional
arguments founded in religious beliefs. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d
372 (D.C. 1972). Examples of common-law judicial decision-making include
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Policy makers draw upon ethical principles of the medical
profession to guide them in establishing or giving content to
these rights. The principle of individual autonomy directs doctors
to honor their patients' preferences regarding the proper role of
modern medicine in their lives.1 4 The principle of beneficence
directs doctors to further the best interests of their patients. 49
The principle of fidelity directs doctors to minister loyally to
their patients rather than considering the needs or desires of
others. 50
These legal rights and the principles of medical ethics that
inform them guide policy makers to respect individuals, their
preferences and best interests, and to refrain from consideration
of the interests of others. These principles of respect for indi-
viduals accommodate the diverse and highly valued preferences
of individuals regarding the goals and means of medical inter-
ventions in their lives. For incompetent individuals, including
anencephalic infants, these principles guide policy makers to
honor the individuals' preferences, if they can be determined
or, if they cannot, to honor the preferences they would hold in
light of their own best interests and without regard to the
interests of others.' 5 Welfarist analysis does not incorporate
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969), in which the
Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that it would permit a kidney to be
removed from an incompetent ward of the state for the purpose of transplan-
tation into his brother, but only because the death of the incompetent's brother
likely would be more emotionally and psychologically damaging to the incom-
petent than the operation to remove the incompetent's kidney.
148. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (N.J. 1985). For a general
discussion of the principle of autonomy in medical ethics, see TOM L. BEAU-
cHAmP & JAmES F. CrMDRESS, PRINCI'LES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHIcs 67-113 (3d
ed. 1989); VEATCH, supra note 122, at 190-213.
149. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). For a general discussion
of the principle of beneficence, see BEAUCHAMP & CHn.DRESS, supra note 148,
at 194-249.
150. See UNw. ANATOMICAL Gr ACT, 8A U.L.A. (1993) [hereinafter
UAGA]. The UAGA prohibits the physician or surgeon who attends an organ
donor at death from harvesting the donor's organs for transplantation unless
specifically requested to do so by the donor in a signed writing. Id. §§ 2(b),
2(d), 8(b). For a general discussion of the principle of fidelity in medical
ethics, see BEAUCHAmp & CmLaDmss, supra note 148, at 341-57.
151. See In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975), in
which the court refused to permit tests to be performed upon an incompetent
to determine if he would be a suitable donor for a kidney transplant to save
the life of his sister:
An incompetent particularly should have his own interests pro-
tected. Certainly no advantage should be taken of him. In the
absence of real consent on his part, and in a situation where no
benefit to him has been established, we fail to find any authority
for the county court, or this court, to approve this operation.
Id. at 182.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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these principles of respect for individuals. In the context of
bioethics, involving diverse and highly valued preferences, this
failure is especially problematic.
An additional problem with the application of welfarism in
the bioethical context is a practical one. The problem arises in
efforts to compare and rank the welfare experiences of anen-
cephalic infants and other individuals. These comparisons and
rankings are necessary if policy makers are to compute the net
of pleasure and pain to all individuals resulting from the adop-
tion of a policy measure permitting the sacrifice of anencephalic
infants.
Efforts to compare and rank the welfare experiences of an-
encephalic infants and others are rendered hopeless, however,
by the impossibility of knowing the nature and degree of pain
experienced by infants lacking cerebral brain capacity who are
deprived of a day or two of life. Policy makers might assume
the pain to be miniscule, but cannot hope to know. 152
Policy makers may believe they are better able to compare
and rank the welfare experiences of the parents of the recipient
and donor infants. In the context of bioethical tragedies, how-
ever, in which individual preferences are diverse, failures of
knowledge are severe. For example, family members, who pre-
sumably know one another best, often confess failure in efforts
to know what other family members would have chosen with
respect to medical treatment decisions involving matters of life
and death.'53 As a practical matter, welfarism is impossible to
apply in a context in which problems with interpersonal com-
parisons are aggravated by the diversity of individual preferences
regarding medical treatment.
A third problem arises with respect to the formula selected
for calculating maximization of social welfare. If the formula
merely aggregates pleasure and pain, justice may require per-
mitting the sacrifice of anencephalic infants. If, instead, the
formula assures that the worst-off member of society is as well
152. "Often, it is unclear whether and to what extent a patient such as
Claire Conroy is capable of, or is in fact, experiencing pain. Similarly, medical
experts are often unable to determine with any degree of certainty the extent
of a nonverbal person's intellectual functioning or the depth of his emotional
life." In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1233.
153. See, e.g., In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607,
611 (N.Y. 1988). This is one of the reasons for the impetus to the use of
living wills, durable powers of attorney, and other legal devices for instructing
doctors and others regarding preferred medical treatment decisions in the event
of an individual's incapacity. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting the "practical
wisdom" of such devices); UNr. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B
U.L.A. (1987 & Supp. 1993).
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off as possible, justice may require forbidding such sacrifice. 1" 4
Although what is at stake is a matter of life and death, policy
makers will not find guidance within the welfarist framework
itself as to which formula should be applied. The choice ulti-
mately requires resort to other ethical principles, such as prin-
ciples founded in respect for individuals or egalitarianism.
Thus, policy makers do not and should not resort to welfarism
to determine the requirements of justice with respect to bioethical
issues. Welfarism cannot accommodate the diverse and highly
valued preferences of individuals with respect to the role of
modern medicine in their experiences of suffering and death.
Justice in this context should be founded in respect for indivi-
duals as embodied in legal principles protecting individual rights
and ethical principles of the medical profession.
C. Welfarism and Public Health
In the context of public health, policy makers must determine
the requirements of justice with respect to policy measures that
improve the health status of members of the community by
reducing or eliminating environmental threats to health. There
is broad consensus upton the goals, and the importance of the
goals, of public health measures. For example, nearly all can
agree that access to purified water supplies is a desirable goal.
Furthermore, nearly all can agree that the goal is an important
one given the serious threats to health posed by contaminated
water. In addition, there is broad consensus upon acceptable
means to public health goals. Nearly all can agree, for example,
that the means to the goal of purified water should be a
governmentally designed and implemented water works.
There is consensus regarding the means to achieve public
health goals for three reasons. First, most public health measures
entail negligible intrusions upon the privacy and bodily integrity
of individuals.'55 For most individuals most of the time, public
health measures do not even intrude upon their consciousness.
Second, public health measures have proved to be extraordinarily
effective means to achieving the important shared goals of
154. This assumes that the worst-off anencephalic infant would not be better
off dead sooner.
155. Mandatory vaccination programs entail the most significant intrusions
and have aroused the most opposition. See RUSSELL, supra note 34, at 10-30
(describing opposition to vaccination for smallpox and measles); see also
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (rejecting a challenge to an
early mandatory vaccination ordinance). The nonintrusiveness of most public
health measures contrasts with the intrusiveness of means in the bioethical
context. See supra part III.B.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
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reducing threats to health status. 5 6 Third, governmental public
health measures are necessary to solve economic problems that
otherwise might deprive communities of the benefits of improved
individual health status through reduced threats to health. These
economic problems include the tendency of producers to under-
produce public goods1 57 and to overproduce goods with negative
externalities. "58
The public goods problem arises from the inability of prod-
ucers to control who receives the benefits of the public goods
they produce. Because consumers know they will receive the
benefits of these public goods regardless of whether they pay
for them, some will refuse to pay for them. 59 As a consequence,
producers may underproduce or fail to produce public goods.
Public health measures solve public goods problems through
governmental action."" For example, pure water and sanitation
systems eradicate diseases. Producers of these systems cannot,
however, control who receives the benefits of disease eradication.
Everyone will benefit regardless of whether they pay. Hence,
private producers might not provide these systems and, conse-
quently, the community would not enjoy the benefits of disease
eradication.' 61 To solve this public goods problem, local govern-
156. Several major causes of death have almost disappeared due to public
health measures, such as the provision of pure water, the proper handling of
sewage, and the promotion of vaccinations. Major causes of death that have
almost disappeared include typhoid, diphtheria, and gastroenteritis. RUSSELL,
supra note 34, at 1. The efficacy of public health measures in improving
health status contrasts with the relative ineffectiveness of individual health
care services. See supra part II.B.
157. Public goods are goods that yield positive effects upon other persons.
FREEDMAN, supra note 76, at 423 (distinguishing between positive and negative
public goods).
158. Negative externalities are the negative effects of one person's acts upon
other persons. Id.
159. See id. at 421-22. For example, all people in the United States benefit
from the national defense. Nevertheless, each individual knows that, in the
absence of compulsory taxation to support a national defense, that individual
would receive the benefit of national defense regardless of whether the indi-
vidual paid for it.
160. Id. at 420-22.
161. Similarly, immunizations benefit those who obtain vaccinations as well
as those who do not. Producers of vaccines cannot control the benefit that
the nonvaccinated enjoy from the reduction or eradication of contagious
diseases. Hence, governmental measures promote and, in some cases, mandate
immunization. RussELL, supra note 34, at 11, 26. Current means of promoting
vaccination include measures designed to promote the production of vaccine
by relieving manufacturers from potential tort liability for injuries caused by
the vaccines. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA),
Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-33 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (intending to assure the
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ments provide these systems and charge community members
for the benefits.
Public health measures also potentially solve negative exter-
nalities problems. Producers tend to overproduce products with
negative externalities because, in calculating the costs and ben-
efits of production, producers take into account only their own
costs. They fail to include costs imposed upon others, i.e., the
negative externalities.162
Public health measures solve negative externalities problems
through governmental action as well. For example, regulations
to protect the safety of workers force producers of negative
externalities that threaten the health of others to internalize the
costs of these negative externalities either by eliminating the
negative externalities or by paying fees or fines.16 1
Thus, in the context of public health, there is consensus upon
the goals of public health measures and their importance. In
addition, there is consensus upon governmental public health
measures as generally nonintrusive, highly effective, and neces-
sary means to achieve public health goals. In this context,
objections to the application of welfarism are few, and policy
makers should apply the principles of welfarism to guide their
policy choices.
Defining the content of individual welfare as consisting in the
pleasure of improved health status through implementation of
public health measures does not pose significant problems. Pub-
lic health measures generally do not entail significant intrusions
upon others nor intrusions on some that are not endured by
all.16 Hence, conflicts with principles of respect for individuals
are unlikely to arise.
availability of the diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP) vaccine by estab-
lishing a compensation program in the event of injury or death). See also
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding an ordinance
requiring compulsory smallpox vaccinations).
162. FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 423.
163. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596,
84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
164. Individual rights are most likely to be tested by mandatory vaccination
or similar measures, such as quarantine. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26 (stating if
the survival of the community is at stake, individual objections cannot be
accommodated unless they are based upon individual unsuitability for medical
treatment). Policy measures such as mandatory helmet laws for motorcycle
riders are akin to public health measures in that they affect the health of a
broad segment of the community. However, these measures have as their
primary goal the regulation of the conduct of others for their own good,
rather than the reduction of negative externalities constituting health threats
to the community, and these measures also are fairly intrusive. These measures
arouse intense opposition founded in claims of violation of individual rights.
See BEAucHAmp, supra note 34, at 121-22.https://openscholarshi .wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
WELFARISM OUT OF CONTEXT
Comparisons of individual welfare do not pose significant
practical problems because nearly everyone agrees upon the goals
of public health measures. If some individuals derive particular
pleasure from raising water of questionable purity to their lips
and drinking deeply, they are few in number and not outspo-
ken.'"
Calculating the maximization of social welfare also is not
problematic. Regardless of the formula applied, principles of
respect for individuals are unlikely to be offended given the
shared goals and the nonintrusiveness of the means employed
in public health measures. Furthermore, regardless of the for-
mula applied, public health measures naturally yield egalitarian
benefits. All members of the community are potentially vulner-
able to contagious diseases. All potentially benefit from public
health measures.
In the context of public health, welfarism properly defines
the demands of justice. Policy makers fail to vindicate the
demands of justice if they fail to calculate the most expedient
means to achieve important shared goals.
D. Health Care Delivery Systems
Health care delivery issues require policy makers to determine
the requirements of justice with respect to the finance and
delivery of individual health care services to defined communi-
ties.'" In the health care delivery context, there is no consensus
with respect to the goals of health care delivery; preferences are
diverse.' 67 In addition, the goals of health care delivery policy
measures vary in their importance. The goal of obtaining access
to expensive life-extending medical care evokes intense emotions
and may implicate ethical principles. The goals of eliminating
free riders and limiting overall spending on health care, although
of concern to many, do not evoke the same responses. Thus,
preferences regarding the goals of health care delivery are di-
verse, and some are highly valued, some are not.
With respect to the means for achieving these goals, there
also is no consensus.'" This is so for three reasons. First, the
165. Interpersonal comparisons are more problematic with respect to policy
measures such as mandatory helmet laws for motorcycle riders. Some indivi-
duals do derive pleasure from riding motorcycles without helmets.
166. The community may be defined by citizenship or residency status, or
according to qualifications that include age, income, wealth, and health status.
See, e.g., Medicare, Title XVIII, and Medicaid, Title XIX, Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396u (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
167. See supra part II.
168. See supra part II.
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intrusiveness of proposed policy measures varies. For example,
if a communal system restricts choices of health care providers
or the services that may be obtained, this directly affects matters
of personal privacy and bodily integrity that arouse intense
emotions and that may implicate ethical principles. On the other
hand, there is broad indifference to the systemic means for
regulating and financing health care delivery. For example, most
do not care about the particulars of the mechanism for
financing 69 health care services, provided that the mechanism
does not negatively affect the delivery of individual health care
services. 70 Second, the efficacy of various proposed policy meas-
ures in achieving important goals, such as improved health
status, is limited.' 7' Third, there are no economic problems that
require reliance upon a particular means for delivering health
care services. Health care providers are fully capable of charging
for benefits rendered; health care services are abundantly pro-
duced. Thus, preferences regarding the means of health care
delivery are diverse, and some are matters of indifference, some
are not.
169. Modern health care delivery systems, both communal and noncom-
munal, pool and redistribute the financial risks of obtaining health care
services. A communal system pools the financial risks of a defined community
and redistributes these risks through its compulsory funding mechanism. A
noncommunal system pools financial risks in a wide variety of risk pools,
from private insurance risk pools, to self-insured employer risk pools, to state
high-risk pools for the uninsurable, to national risk pools for the disabled
and elderly. The noncommunal system then redistributes the financial risks
through private insurance payments, withheld wages, and tax assessments. For
those individuals who are not members of pools, financial risks are either
borne by the individuals, or shifted to others through the provision of
uncompensated or undercompensated health care services.
170. Most Americans generally indicate indifference to particular systemic
means; they care instead about matters of individual health care delivery.
Grover G. Norquist, The Great Patriotic War, 26 AM. SPECTATOR 70 (1993)
(citing October 1993 poll showing that only 19% of Americans believe that
the Clinton Plan will improve health care delivery, while 34% believe quality
will suffer). However, some political theorists and policy makers do care about
the financing mechanism. See generally ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCH, STATE, AND
UTOPIA (1974); see also Norquist, supra.
[T]he "health care debate is the decisive battle about whether we
become a free society or become a socialist state." The Clinton
plan .. . "will transfer so much money and power to the govern-
ment that it would change the nation." . . . [T]he Clinton plan
relies on price controls, government bureaucracies, and the elim-
ination of consumer choice. "Clinton's plan is based on the
premise that a government monopoly can do things more effec-
tively and more economically than the market and competition."
Id. (quoting Rep. Newt Gingrich and Sen. Phil Gramm).
171. See supra part II.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
WELFARISM OUT OF CONTEXT
Thus the policy maker in the context of national health care
policy faces a complex problem. In the absence of consensus
upon goals or means, and given that goals vary from the
mundane to the important, and means vary from the nonintru-
sive to the intrusive, the application of welfarist principles raises
complex practical problems and problems with conflicting prin-
ciples. In this context, welfarist analysis should play only a
limited role. Other principles of justice suitable for this context
have yet to be developed. 172
First, determining the content of individual welfare in this
context is highly problematic. Different characterizations of
individual welfare yield entirely different conclusions. If, for
example, individuals prefer secure access to health care because
they mistakenly believe secure access will improve their health
more than competing policy measures that improve job oppor-
tunities or education or wealth, then perhaps their preferences
should be excluded because they are irrational. Nevertheless,
individuals may feel great pleasure as a result of an assurance
of secure access even if they are mistaken about its efficacy in
improving health. Welfarism does not in itself offer a basis for
choosing between rational preferences and irrational pleasures.173
Furthermore, if individual welfare is characterized as the
satisfaction of rational preferences, additional problems arise
with the process for determining these preferences. For example,
the "Oregon Plan" imposes a rationing of health care benefits
for Medicaid recipients to permit the extension of Medicaid
benefits to an expanded group of poor individuals. 74 The Oregon
Plan employs a methodology for determining the value of var-
ious medical services and for ranking them.'7 The methodology
considers, among other things, the cost-effectiveness of the
services as well as valuations of the services by Oregon citizens
who expressed their opinions in telephone polling and in a series
of town meetings. 176 The Oregon Plan thus establishes the con-
172. See infra part III.E (discussing principles that should contribute to a
suitable framework of justice).
173. See ENGELHARDT, supra note 117, at 107-09.
174. See generally RATIONING AmERICA'S MEDICAL CARE, supra note 25
(offering descriptions and analyses of the Oregon Plan from a variety of
perspectives). The Oregon Plan went into effect on February 1, 1994. See
Marilyn Chase, Oregon's New Health Rationing Means More Care for Some
but Less for Others, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1994, at B1.
175. The complex methodology is summarized in Michael J. Garland,
Rationing in Public: Oregon's Priority-Setting Methodology, in RATIONING
AmERICA'S MEDICAL CARE, supra note 25, at 44-50; see also Kaplan, supra
note 32, at 60-75 (explaining the quality-of-life approach that he favors and
generally applauding the Oregon Plan, although criticizing certain aspects of
its implementation).
176. Garland, supra note 175, at 42-50.
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tent of individual welfare characterized as rational preferences
by reliance on the opinions of experts and of other Oregonians
regarding what Medicaid recipients should prefer.
This process gives rise to practical objections as well as
objections based upon conflicting principles. As a practical
matter, individuals generally know their particular goals regard-
ing medical interventions best and hence are in the best position
to rationally pursue them. Although access to the medical advice
of experts or the value-based advice of fellow community mem-
bers may be valuable to individuals in this pursuit, decision-
making by these experts and fellow community members is likely
to be mistaken. Furthermore, because preferences regarding the
goals and means of delivering individual health care services are
diverse and highly valued, mistaken decisions will be both com-
monplace and offensive to principles of respect for individuals. 17
Additional practical problems and problems with conflicting
principles arise in attempting to compare and rank welfare
experiences resulting from alternative health care delivery meas-
ures. For example, the Oregon Plan provoked enormous con-
troversy, which threatened the political viability of the Plan, by
its process of comparing and ranking the welfare experiences as
a result of the delivery of various health care services. 7 1 In
matters of individual health care services, involving diverse and
highly valued preferences, such comparisons and rankings are
both a practical impossibility and violative of principles of
respect for individuals. 179
177. In rejecting the original request for a federal waiver necessary for
implementation of the Oregon Plan, the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services objected to the Oregon Plan, in
part, because of its inconsistency with the individual rights of disabled persons
under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12213 and 47 U.S.C. 6 225
(Supp. IV. 1992)). See Tom Mason, Sullivan Made the Right Choice in
Rejecting the Oregon Plan, 2 HEALTH MATRIx 85 (1992); see also supra part
III.B (discussing ethical principles embodying respect for individuals in the
context of bioethics).
178. See generally CALABRESI & BOBBrrT, supra note 79; RATioNiNa AMER-
ICA'S MEDICAL CARE, supra note 25. Because the welfarist analysis ultimately
requires comparisons that provoke controversy, policy makers applying wel-
farist analysis to health care delivery issues typically evade this requirement
rather than squarely confronting it, as in Oregon. See Baker, supra note 25,
at 221-24; see also CALABRSI & BoBBrrT, supra note 79.
179. See supra note 5. An example of a governmentally funded program
that reflects an anti-welfarist approach to the provision of health care to a
particular group of individuals in light of their dire circumstances is the United
States' End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Program. Under the ESRD Program,
the U.S. Congress repeatedly has authorized large expenditures to save the
lives of a relatively small number of individuals who suffer from end stagehttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
WELFARISM OUT OF CONTEXT
Lastly, in calculating the maximization of social welfare,
policy makers face stark choices in choosing between a strict
aggregation or an alternative formula. If a utilitarian formula
is applied, the sickest may lose the benefits of expensive treat-
ments, the poorest may lose the benefits of more generous
subsidies. 80 Alternative formulas that protect the interests of
the worst-off comport with principles of respect for individuals
and egalitarianism.' 8 1 However, application of these alternative
formulas may pose practical difficulties because of the poten-
tially unlimited demand for health care services that could be
of benefit to the sickest.'
Welfarism cannot succeed in guiding policy makers to just
choices regarding national health care reform because welfarism
cannot accommodate diverse and highly valued preferences re-
garding the delivery of individual health care services. Welfarist
analysis can inform the debate regarding the expediency of
various systemic means for regulating and financing health care
delivery.' Ultimately, however, welfarism cannot resolve the
question of what justice requires with respect to proposed reform
of the national health care system.
E. Conclusion
Policy makers apply different principles of justice in the
contexts of bioethics and public health. There are good reasons
for this. Welfarism is ill-suited to the context of bioethics
because welfarism falls to accommodate diverse and highly
renal disease. Two authors described the willingness to rescue at great expense
an identifiable few and contrast the unwillingness, at far less expense, to save
statistical lives. CA.LARasI & BoBBIT, supra note 79, at 186-89. The ESRD
Program, which assures renal dialysis to every American who could benefit
from it, is often decried as an expensive program in relation to the relatively
few who benefit from it. Nevertheless, for those who benefit, dialysis means
the difference between life and death, hence the impetus to its adoption and
the resistance to eliminating it. For a discussion comparing the approach in
the United Kingdom, see HALPER, supra note 49, at 155-56; see also CALABRESI
& BOBBITr, supra note 79, at 184-86.
180. See LEGAND, supra note 32. The Oregon Plan has attracted significant
opposition on the basis of its application of a utilitarian formula. See Sara
Rosenbaum, Poor Women, Poor Children, Poor Policy: The Oregon Medicaid
Experiment, in RATIONING AMBIUCA's MEDICAL CARE, supra note 25, at 91-
104; Robert M. Veatch, The Orgon Experiment: Needless and Real Worries,
in RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE, supra note 25, at 82-87.
181. See supra part III.B (discussing conflicting principles in the context of
bioethics); see generally CAL RaRsi & BOBBITT, supra note 79; RATIONING
AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE, supra note 25; Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 92,
at 850.
182. See DA~imLs, supra note 6, at 53-54.
183. See supra part II.
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valued individual preferences. Welfarism is well-suited to the
context of public health given the broad consensus that prevails
regarding the goals of public health and the means for achieving
those goals.
Welfarism tempts policy makers in the context of national
health care delivery. Welfarism invokes the power of rationality,
holding out the promise of clear and definite answers in deter-
mining what is ethically required of society in response to the
suffering and deaths of its members. However, the power of
rationality falls short and the promise of clear and definite
answers is a false promise. It is futile to seek justice by imposing
a welfarist calculus upon a context so rich in emotional and
ethical content and diversity. The delivery of services to indivi-
duals who come to doctors seeking help in matters of deep
concern that require intimate interactions is different than the
delivery of purified water to the taps in a community.
Successful principles of justice for application in the context
of national health care delivery must acknowledge this differ-
ence. These principles of justice must emerge from the context
of health care delivery, a context in which doctors, patients,
and the American legal system have developed ethical and legal
principles that appropriately acknowledge the difference. These
principles of respect for individuals should serve as the foun-
dation of an appropriate framework of justice for application
in this context; a framework yet to be developed.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/8
